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ABSTRACT 
 
The threat of terrorism against the United States has been a primary concern of 
public policy makers, particularly after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Economic 
theory and statistical analysis provide valuable insights into the challenge of 
estimating the regional and national economic impacts of future attacks. Terrorist 
events represent exogenous shocks on the economy which can cause significant 
emotional and psychological damage. The initial chapters describe a simulation model 
that captures the impacts of agricultural terrorism (agroterrorism) on the economic 
performance of various sectors within a regional economy, while the final chapters 
examine the impacts of agroterrorism on U.S. financial markets.  
I begin the analysis by examining the probable direct and indirect economic 
impacts of bioterrorism originating in St. Lawrence County, New York. The specific 
biological weapon examined is a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) attack that disrupts 
the local agricultural food supply. A county-level simulation is valuable because it 
focuses on the immediate impact of FMD, providing useful estimates of the short-to-
medium term impacts. The regional model contains in depth analysis of the livestock 
industry with specific links to regional tourism, and the results section includes impact 
estimates using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework. 
St. Lawrence County serves as an interesting case study to explore supply-
chain linkages, since the region depends heavily on its livestock and tourism industries 
which would suffer following an FMD attack. I perform simulations assuming that the 
attack has no direct impact on dairy farm products, before relaxing this assumption to 
account for economic impacts associated with parallel shocks to the livestock and 
dairy industries. The methodology focuses on estimating the economic implications of 
production and trade disruptions in the international market. The costs of 
 agroterrorism are estimated in terms of disruptions to regional output, employment, 
and value added for key sectors within the economy. I provide impact assessments for 
livestock, tourism, dairy, and all sectors within the region.  
 The direct costs of the attack within the region would reflect the initial 
output reductions, and the indirect costs would reflect changes in inter-industry 
transactions as supplying industries react to falling demand from the directly affected 
industries. Indirect effects significantly increase the magnitude of losses suffered by 
the economy as the damage flows beyond the industries directly impacted. These 
indirect effects would include losses suffered by related industries, such as firms 
engaged in food supply, transportation, distribution, and retail. The firm-level impacts 
are outside the scope of this research project. 
 The latter chapters explore the broader impacts on financial asset classes in 
equities, fixed income, and foreign exchange to produce real GDP growth rate 
forecasts using the Global Insight macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy. By 
linking to the macro model following the regional analysis, we can examine the 
economy-wide repercussions of a terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture. I will show that a 
state of financial uncertainty brought forth by terrorism can decrease consumer 
confidence, increase interest rates, increase credit spreads, dampen the stock market, 
and impact the value of the U.S. dollar relative to the currencies of trading partners.
 I will demonstrate that extreme terrorist events tend to disrupt the normal 
relationships among financial asset classes. The results section for the macro impact 
model includes real GDP growth rate forecasts and projected real output losses. For 
both the regional and national models I draw on the literature to examine the attack 
under various assumptions regarding the severity of output reductions. I conclude with 
policy recommendations based on my findings, as well as directions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND 
 
1.1    Region of Study 
The initial chapters focus on simulating the regional economic impacts of a 
foot-and-mouth disease (hereafter FMD) attack on local agricultural food supplies 
within St. Lawrence County, New York. A county-level simulation offers a valuable 
starting point because it focuses on the immediate consequences of FMD, providing 
conservative estimates of the short-to-medium term impacts. The time frame under 
consideration is short enough that the outbreak does not impose economic losses to 
neighboring regions, but long enough that the outbreak delivers measurable 
countywide repercussions. St. Lawrence Country contains primary livestock and 
tourism industries which would suffer following an FMD attack.  
Agriculture and tourism, which are two sectors most vulnerable to 
agroterrorism, contribute significantly to the local economy. This county thus serves 
as a representative case to explore regional supply-chain linkages. Data collected in 
2005 from the National Agricultural Statistics Service show that St. Lawrence County 
was in that year the largest producer of beef cows in New York, and was the second 
largest cattle-producing county with 73,000 head of cattle (Table 1). Table 2 provides 
summary data for the St. Lawrence County economy, compiled from the Impact 
Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) database.  
 
Table 1   New York County-Level Rankings of Cattle Production 
New York 
County 
All Cattle (# 
head) 
Beef Cows (# 
head) 
Dairy Cows (# 
head) 
Wyoming 87,500 1,500 47,600 
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Table 1   (Continued) 
St. Lawrence 73,000 3,900 36,900 
Jefferson 67,100 3,300 32,000 
Washington 59,000 1,500 23,500 
Cayuga 58,900 1,900 30,100 
State Total 1,410,000 80,000 650,000 
 
Table 2   Key Economic Statistics for St. Lawrence County (2000 data) 
Population 111,931 
Area (square miles) 2,686 
Employment 49,915 
Households 40,527 
Number of Industries 170 
Income per Household $54,512 
Total Personal Income $2,209,188,000 
 
St. Lawrence County comprises 32 towns, 1 city, and 13 villages. In addition 
to a vital agricultural sector, the southeastern third of the county is a major tourist 
attraction. Within the Adirondack region, a patchwork of private and public lands 
encompasses several hamlets, scenic vistas, and wilderness areas that are open to the 
public for recreational use. There is significant tourism demand in St. Lawrence 
County for fishing, hunting, canoeing, cycling, bird watching, horseback riding, 
skiing, and water sports. The region has many hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, 
campgrounds, parks, museums, restaurants, theater performances, and art centers. As 
will be explained shortly, an FMD attack would impact not only agricultural 
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industries, but also industries engaged in tourism activity. Figure 1 shows the 
geographical location of St. Lawrence County.1 
 
 
Figure 1   Geographical location of St. Lawrence County, New York 
 
1.2    The Threat of Agroterrorism 
An attack on agricultural crops would be more difficult to execute than an 
attack on livestock because the former requires favorable weather conditions and 
greater technical capabilities. Additionally, government officials and farmers have 
more experience coping with plant diseases than with livestock epidemics. In general 
livestock farming is more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than crop farming, because 
livestock are housed in very close proximity to one another. St. Lawrence County is 
particularly vulnerable to agroterrorism precisely because of its dependency on cattle 
production.  
My research emphasizes the regional impacts of FMD, and assumes that the 
outbreak is contained within St. Lawrence County in the short-to-medium term.2 The 
                                                 
1 For more information about the St. Lawrence economy, refer to iloveny.com, the official New York 
State tourism website, or the New York Visitors Network at visitnewyorkstate.net/stlawrence. Map 
reproduced from www.answers.com/topic/st-lawrence-county-new-york. 
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regional model contains in depth analysis of the livestock industry with specific links 
to regional tourism. I examine a number of scenarios corresponding to different 
extents of the economic damage following such an outbreak. The size and distribution 
of the impacts over sectors and time would depend on a range of factors, including the 
nature of the attacks, the multiplier effects, the type of policies adopted in response to 
the attacks, and the resilience of the markets (Bruck and Wickstrom, 2004).  
The results section first presents simulation output for 5 scenarios assuming 
direct impacts to livestock and tourism only, and no direct impacts to dairy farm 
products. I will then relax this assumption to account for the economic impacts of 
FMD with parallel shocks to the livestock and dairy industries. The direct impact of 
terrorist attacks depends on timing and place, and is highly unpredictable (Richardson 
et al., 2005). A quantitative framework is therefore needed to evaluate various 
alternatives, which in turn can contribute to the preparation of effective protection 
against bioterrorist threats. 
Agricultural security in general is regarded as a high priority for the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.3 FMD in particular is considered one of the three 
most serious foreign animal diseases, in addition to avian influenza and New Castle 
disease (Wilson et al. 2000). Of all animal diseases, FMD has the potential for greatest 
economic damage, due to its rapid spread and the expected loss of international 
customers. Pate and Cameron (2001) describe FMD as the agricultural equivalent to 
the use of small pox on humans, except that FMD is more readily available than 
                                                                                                                                            
2 This assumption would not likely hold under longer time horizons; however, the analysis provides 
useful insights into the countywide repercussions immediately following an FMD attack. Should the 
disease become endemic, the costs to surrounding regions and the national economy would greatly 
exceed the estimates to be presented here. Due to the necessary assumptions built into the regional 
model, the impact estimates to follow should therefore be considered lower-bound estimates of the true 
value. 
3 The importance of agro-security, specifically foot-and-mouth disease, is described in “Homeland 
Security Selects Texas A&M University and University of Minnesota to Lead New Centers of 
Excellence on Agro-Security,” Department of Homeland Security Press Release, April 27, 2004. 
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smallpox. The OIE of the World Organization for Animal Health maintains a list of 
transmissible diseases, and FMD is the first disease on the OIE List A due to its 
economic importance and ease of transmission. List A diseases such as FMD are 
attractive agents for bioterrorism, because of the potential for rapid spread.  
Attacks on agriculture are not necessarily intended to target humans, but are 
mostly a means of extortion, intimidation, or economic punishment (Pate and 
Cameron 2001). Chalk (2001) defines agroterrorism as the deliberate introduction of a 
disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, for purposes of 
undermining stability and/or generating fear.4 The vulnerability of the U.S. food 
supply system was highlighted in a recent General Accounting Office report which 
casts doubt on the system’s ability to detect and quickly respond to an agroterrorist 
attack. There are several lags built into the damage-control procedure, from the time it 
takes investigators to determine if the illness or disease was deliberately introduced, to 
the time it takes for procedures to be enacted and followed.  
The agricultural sector is one of the easiest sectors of the economy to disrupt, 
and the likelihood of inflicting maximum damage from the interruption of agricultural 
food supplies is high (Cupp et al., 2004). An attack on agriculture should be regarded 
as a high-consequence, high-probability event that deserves greater attention than it is 
currently receiving. A terrorist group could obtain an anti-agricultural biological 
weapon by isolating it from the environment, obtaining it from microbe laboratories, 
or obtaining it from state sponsors.  
                                                 
4  The case study examined in this paper qualifies as agroterrorism based on this definition. Enders and 
Sandler (2004) define terrorism as the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence by an 
individual or subnational group to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a 
large audience usually beyond the immediate victims. Nestle (2003) defines food bioterrorism as “the 
deliberate poisoning or contamination of the food supply to achieve some political goal”. See also 
Hoffman (1988), Mickolus (1982), and Schmid and Jongman (1988). 
 
 6
There exists a common misconception that agricultural pathogens are difficult 
to obtain and disseminate, when in fact an attack could be carried out by a series of 
infections generated by pathogens delivered to various public locations (Casagrande 
2000). For example, the U.S. food supply could be attacked on the farm, in processing 
plants, in grocery stores, or at food service locations. Due to these multiple potential 
entry points typically associated with an open society, farms and agricultural systems 
have become increasingly susceptible to terrorist attacks aimed at destroying 
consumer confidence in the stability of food supplies.  
 
1.3    Characteristics of the U.S. Food Supply System 
The other source of vulnerability is the centralized nature of cattle production. 
The food system of St. Lawrence County and the greater United States is predicated 
on centralized production within a widespread distribution network. Improved 
agricultural efficiency through centralization has, in part, allowed American 
consumers to benefit by allocating a lower share of their personal disposable income 
on food expenditures than ever before. The remarkable efficiency of the food 
marketing and distribution system has been very successful at transporting large 
quantities of food over great distances and has contributed to these declining food 
costs. Agricultural producers adopt centralization to take advantage of scale 
economies, while at the same time maintain an extensive distribution network to 
expand market shares. As a result, increasingly more commodities are produced from 
batch processing, then distributed and consumed across regional boundaries. This 
allows a wide variety of food items to travel more quickly and cheaply to consumers, 
but also makes the supply chain more vulnerable to sabotage.  
Figure 1 depicts the food supply chain for animals, reproduced from Cupp et 
al. (2004). The integrated supply chain, resulting from globalization and consolidation 
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of agriculture, has increased the number of points along which the terrorist could 
attack the food supply. Because of centralized production, animals are concentrated in 
a few production facilities, increasing the likelihood that the deliberate introduction of 
a single pathogen could result in widespread infection (Breeze 2004). For instance, 
three packers control roughly 72% of the live beef market, and four packers control 
roughly 57% of the pork market. This vertical integration and concentration of 
agribusiness firms has contributed to the vulnerability of terrorist attack. A major 
FMD attack would cause catastrophic economic damage, due to the size of the 
international export market, the interdependence of regional markets, and the 
intensification of production technologies.  
 
 
Figure 2   U.S. Food Supply Chain (Animals) 
 
1.4    History of Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
FMD is a potential instrument of terrorism aimed at attacking the livestock 
supply chain, and if introduced in the U.S. could have similar consequences to the 
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outbreak in Great Britain that resulted in serious economic and emotional damage to 
farmers, communities, and the overall economy. Not including economic losses 
resulting from trade restrictions, the U.K outbreak caused over $6.5 billion in 
economic damage and imposed a $5 billion cost to the British tourism industry 
(Kohnen, 2000). FMD is widely considered to be the most economically devastating 
livestock disease. FMD is a highly infectious viral disease that does not affect humans, 
but can infect cattle, swine, sheep, goats, elk, deer, bison, and other cloven-hoofed 
animals. In young animals under conditions of dense stocking, a mortality rate 
approaching 90% is likely. FMD has been inadvertently introduced into the U.S. on 
eight previous occasions since the first case was reported in 1870. Although the U.S. 
has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, different types of the FMD virus have 
been identified in Africa, South America, Asia, and part of Europe. There have been 
outbreaks of FMD in 75 countries between 1996 and 1999, with the most recent 
outbreaks occurring in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Argentina, and France.  
These previous natural outbreaks of FMD shed light onto the potential 
economic devastation brought about by deliberate introduction of the disease into the 
livestock population. It is important to note that natural outbreaks do not bring forth 
levels of psychological damage generally associated with terrorism, but they do offer a 
baseline for impact assessments at the regional and national levels (Pate and Cameron 
2001). In particular, an examination of natural outbreaks of FMD allows us to estimate 
the impact of an agroterrorist attack designed to spread the disease. A deliberate 
introduction of FMD into U.S. livestock would result not only in serious economic 
losses in the form of lost products and trade, but also psychological impacts affecting 
the hospitality industries. This would cause severe economic damage to the local 
economy and a loss of consumer confidence in the food supply chain.   
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FMD is not recognized as a zoonotic disease, meaning there is no personal risk 
to the terrorist in terms of accidental transmission from animal to human. Once the 
disease is introduced, however, preventing the spread to susceptible animal species 
becomes a very difficult task, primarily because FMD can spread by way of airborne 
aerosols. The virus can be carried on clothing, uncooked meat from infected animals, 
dairy products from infected animals, and on the wind to other locations within a 100-
kilometer radius. Although humans are not directly affected, tourists can still 
inadvertently spread the disease from one area to another by means of their 
automobiles, clothing, shoes, and respiratory tracts.  
Nearly all exposed animals would become infected, and unless the disease was 
detected early, a regional outbreak could spread quickly to other regions by ordinary 
movements of livestock across state borders. For example, within a week after the 
FMD outbreak in Taiwan was confirmed in 1997, nearly 150,000 cases were 
discovered. Testing for the virus showed that the same strain was present in China, 
leading officials to conclude that it was carried into the country via pork brought into 
Taiwan from China. After this incident, fears regarding the disease dampened 
consumer confidence in meat products from Taiwan, and this fact, combined with the 
loss of export markets, caused a crash in domestic pork prices that lasted several 
weeks following the outbreak.5 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This historical account comes from the report released by FAS (Foreign Agricultural Service) October 
1997. “Foot-and-Mouth Disease Spreads Chaos in Pork Markets,” United States Department of 
Agriculture, FAS, Livestock and Poultry, World Markets and Trade. Cameron et al. (2001) describes 
other cases involving the use of pathogenic agents to contaminate food, in which the objective appeared 
to be economic disruption. 
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1.5    The Potential Consequences of U.S. Agroterrorism 
A single reported case of an FMD attack within the U.S. would impact all 
segments of the U.S. export markets for animal and animal-products. U.S. producers 
would be prohibited from selling animals and animal products on the international 
market until the disease was eradicated. Moreover, deer and other wildlife populations 
could become infected and could cause serious livestock re-infection after the initial 
terrorist attack. FMD could be transmitted to a large number of animals over a wide 
geographic area, as the animals themselves become the vehicle for further 
transmission of the disease (Manning and Baines, 2005). 
The direct economic impacts alone of an FMD attack would be devastating. 
Nationally, agriculture is responsible for one-sixth of U.S. gross domestic product, and 
one in eight Americans are employed in agriculture, making the industry one of the 
largest employers in the U.S. (Parker, 2003). The agricultural sector exports over $50 
billion worth of national output annually, and makes the largest positive contribution 
to the U.S. trade balance. The tables provided below offer data from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service that are specific to St. Lawrence County. In 2002 the 
agricultural sector in this region consisted of 1,451 farms holding a market value of 
agricultural products sold approaching $100 million, with over 90 percent of this total 
market value attributed to livestock, poultry, and their products. 
 
Table 3   Agricultural summary statistics for St. Lawrence County (2002 data) 
Item Value ($) 
Estimated market value of land and buildings, 
average per farm 
198,182 
Estimated market value of all machinery and 
equipment, average per farm 
91,853 
Market value of agricultural products sold  99,715,000 
Market value of agricultural products sold, average 
per farm  
68,722 
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Table 3   (Continued) 
Market value of agricultural products sold for 
livestock, poultry, and their products  
90,817,000 
Total income from farm-related sources, gross 
before taxes and expenses  
2,652,000 
Net cash farm income of operation  14,339,000 
 
 
Table 4   Livestock and poultry inventory and sales for St. Lawrence County (2002) 
Item Value (#) 
Cattle and calves inventory (total) 76,182 
Cattle and calves inventory (beef cows) 3,827 
Cattle and calves inventory (milk cows) 38,018 
Cattle and calves sold  26,546 
Hogs and pigs inventory 1,405 
Hogs and pigs sold 2,379 
Sheep and lambs inventory 3,373 
 
 Estimates of the direct impacts alone are likely to underestimate the true 
extent of the economy-wide damage. Equally important are the indirect impacts that 
are transmitted throughout the economy via the inter-industry linkages. In the 
following, I propose the use of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) model as a general 
equilibrium framework that takes into consideration both the direct and indirect 
impacts of the attack on the entire regional economy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SAM MODEL 
 
2.1 Model Introduction 
This chapter presents the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) model, which I 
employ in this study to simulate the impacts of agroterrorism on the regional 
economy. A SAM is a data system that records the monetary transactions among 
various economic actors to capture the salient interdependence among activities, 
production factors, and household groups. These transactions are contained in a 
framework that is both consistent and complete; consistency implies that for every 
income (of actor i) there must be a corresponding expenditure (of another actor j), 
while completeness is ensured when both the recipient and the provider of every 
transaction are identified. Table 5 shows a typical organization of SAM transactions 
into those belonging to the endogenous accounts, which affect and can be affected by 
the transactions of other accounts, and a group of exogenous accounts that affect the 
former but whose behavior is determined outside of the system. By convention, the 
SAM matrix is square because every actor has a ‘spending account’ (a column) and a 
corresponding ‘income account’ (a row), hence identical number of columns and rows. 
 
Table 5   Endogenous and exogenous transactions in a SAM 
  
Endogenous Accounts 
 
 
Exogenous 
 
  
Productio
n Factors 
(1) 
 
Household 
Groups 
(2) 
 
Production 
Activities 
(3) 
 
Other 
Accounts 
(4) 
 
Totals 
      
Production Factors (1) 0 0 Z13 Y1 X1 
Household Groups (2) Z 21 Z 22 0 Y 2 X 2 
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Table 5   (Continued) 
Production Activities 
(3) 
0 Z 32 Z 33 Y 3 X 3 
Other Accounts (4) Z 41 Z 42 Z 43 Y 4 Y 
    
Totals X 1 X 2 X 3 Y  
 
 
A further disaggregation creates submatrices within the block of endogenous 
accounts, which contain the transactions between production factors, household 
groups, and activities.  For example, submatrix Z13 distributes compensation payments 
by production activities to their workers and shareholders. These payments constitute 
the ‘value added’ that these activities generate.  In contrast, Z33 encapsulates the 
structure of inter-industry linkages (i.e., the input-output transaction matrix), while Z21 
describes the mapping of factors’ income into households’ income.  Naturally, it is the 
explicit treatment of income distribution – among both factors of production and 
household groups – that defines the key distinction between a SAM and its 
predecessor, the Leontieff input-output system. Finally, Z22 captures inter-household 
transfers, and Z32 details households’ consumption pattern into various expenditures 
on goods and services. Note that Yi = Zi4 denotes the exogenous expenditures on 
account i. 
 
2.2    Model Equations 
To transform the SAM database into a model suitable for analyzing the impact 
of agroterrorist attacks, a matrix of average expenditures A needs to be constructed. 
Each element aij of the A matrix is computed as follows: 
jijij Xza /= ,    (1) 
where zij denotes the flow of money from one endogenous account j to another 
endogenous account i, and Xj the total expenditures of the former. For example, 
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zworkers,manufacturing represents workers compensation from their employment in the 
manufacturing industry. Thus in an economy with n endogenous accounts, their 
income identities can be written as follows: 
 
nnnnnnn
nn
nn
YXaXaXaX
YXaXaXaX
YXaXaXaX
+⋅++⋅+⋅=
+⋅++⋅+⋅=
+⋅++⋅+⋅=
Κ
Μ
Κ
Κ
2211
222221212
112121111
  (2) 
which, after suitable rearrangements, can be presented more compactly in matrix 
format: 
( ) YXAI =− ,    (3) 
where A = 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
3332
2221
13
0
0
00
AA
AA
A
, and where Aij are submatrices corresponding to the 
endogenous partitions in Table 1, X = 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
nX
X
X
Μ
2
1
, and Y = 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
nY
Y
Y
Μ
2
1
. 
 Solving Eq. 3 for the endogenous accounts X, one obtains: 
( ) YAIX 1−−=    (4) 
The inverse matrix ( ) 1−− AI  is the well-known matrix of SAM multipliers, which 
measures the magnitude of economic impacts driven by exogenous changes in final 
demand. Note that for a given industry, the multiplier can vary with the size of the 
region. A larger economy typically tends to diversify more, import less, and hence 
purchase more from local producers, resulting in higher multipliers other things equal 
(Sirkin, 1959).  
 The SAM multipliers can be decomposed in order to identify the different 
paths by which an impact is transmitted throughout the economy. In particular, a SAM 
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multiplier can be broken down into its direct, indirect, and induced components. The 
“direct effects” in this study correspond to the initial shock of the FMD attack, which 
include losses in the local farms’ output, employment, and income. Specifically, a 
successful terrorist attack will significantly reduce the livestock industry output 
produced within St. Lawrence County, which in turn will lower the revenues of 
agricultural farms, resulting in lower incomes for farm proprietors and workers. 
This initial, direct effect will have further repercussions due to the fall in 
agricultural demand for intermediate inputs produced in non-farm industries. The 
“indirect effects” thus capture the extent of these inter-industry repercussions. For 
example, a contraction in the agriculture sector will lead to falling demand for animal 
feeds, barn supplies and other industry inputs necessary to maintain farm operations. 
The combined direct and indirect effects are known as the input-output (Type I) 
multipliers, which can be computed by setting inter-industry transactions to be the 
only endogenous variables in the model.6 Thus, using the notations of Eq. 3, Type I 
multipliers are contained in the inverse matrix [ ] 12222 −− AI , where I22 is an identity 
matrix with the same dimensions as A22. 
The induced effects, by contrast, are generated when household consumption 
and income are also considered endogenously. To illustrate these feedbacks, consider 
again an agriculture contraction leading to lower sales of livestock. The result is a 
decline in income for farm workers and producers, who as a result will reduce their 
expenditures on goods and services, in turn adversely affecting other industries in the 
region. The cumulative impact of the direct, indirect, and induced effects is known as 
the Type II multipliers, which are identical to the SAM multipliers [ ] 1−− AI . 
 
                                                 
6 To the best of my knowledge, Miernyck (1965) was the first to coin the terms ‘Type I’ and ‘Type II’ 
multipliers to distinguish between Leontief input-output multipliers and those incorporating the 
feedback effects of household consumption and income. 
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2.3    SAM Output Multipliers 
The output multipliers presented in the tables below relate the changes in sales 
to final demand by the livestock industry to total changes in output by all industries 
within St. Lawrence County.7 Likewise, the income and employment multipliers relate 
the changes in direct income by the livestock industry to changes in total income, and 
the value added multipliers relate the changes in value added in the livestock industry 
to changes in total value added. 
 
Table 6   Output Multipliers for Disaggregated Livestock Industries 
Industry Direct  
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Induced  
Effects 
Total  
Effects 
Type I 
Multiplier 
Type II 
Multiplier 
Ranch Fed 
Cattle 
1.000 0.331 0.136 1.467 1.331 1.467 
Range Fed 
Cattle 
1.000 0.337 0.137 1.475 1.337 1.475 
Cattle 
Feedlots 
1.000 0.174 0.119 1.293 1.174 1.293 
Sheep, Lamb 
and Goats 
1.000 0.307 0.141 1.448 1.307 1.448 
Hogs, Pigs 
and Swine 
1.000 0.179 0.098 1.277 1.179 1.277 
Other Meat 
Animal 
Products 
1.000 0.219 0.094 1.312 1.219 1.312 
Miscellaneous 
Livestock 
1.000 0.190 0.161 1.350 1.190 1.350 
 
Table 7   Employment Multipliers for Disaggregated Livestock Industries 
Industry Direct  
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Induced  
Effects 
Total  
Effects 
Type I 
Multiplier 
Type II 
Multiplier 
Ranch Fed 
Cattle 
12.745 5.161 2.110 20.015 1.405 1.571 
Range Fed 
Cattle 
13.900 5.250 2.135 21.285 1.378 1.531 
Cattle 
Feedlots 
5.185 2.961 1.851 9.997 1.571 1.928 
Sheep, Lamb 
and Goats 
57.409 10.347 2.197 69.953 1.180 1.219 
                                                 
7 Source: Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN), 2000 data. 
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Table 7   (Continued) 
Hogs, Pigs 
and Swine 
10.905 3.116 1.528 15.550 1.286 1.426 
Other Meat 
Animal 
Products 
17.286 3.866 1.456 22.608 1.224 1.308 
Miscellaneous 
Livestock 
27.617 3.438 2.500 33.552 1.124 1.215 
 
Table 8   Value Added Multipliers for Disaggregated Livestock Industries 
Industry Direct  
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Induced  
Effects 
Total  
Effects 
Type I 
Multiplier 
Type II 
Multiplier 
Ranch Fed 
Cattle 
0.216 0.125 0.085 0.426 1.581 1.976 
Range Fed 
Cattle 
0.218 0.115 0.086 0.419 1.527 1.923 
Cattle 
Feedlots 
0.216 0.084 0.075 0.375 1.390 1.736 
Sheep, Lamb 
and Goats 
0.229 0.120 0.089 0.438 1.525 1.913 
Hogs, Pigs 
and Swine 
0.178 0.087 0.062 0.327 1.488 1.834 
Other Meat 
Animal 
Products 
0.152 0.102 0.059 0.313 1.672 2.060 
Miscellaneous 
Livestock 
0.302 0.084 0.101 0.486 1.277 1.611 
 
Table 9   Output Multipliers for Aggregated Industries 
Industry Direct 
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Induced 
Effects 
Total Type I 
Multiplier 
Type II 
Multiplier 
Dairy Farm 
Products 
1.000000 0.243564 0.228463 1.472027 1.243564 1.472027 
Other Agriculture 1.000000 0.239304 0.225903 1.465206 1.239304 1.465206 
All Livestock 1.000000 0.378418 0.227258 1.605677 1.378418 1.605677 
Mining 1.000000 0.383508 0.286523 1.670031 1.383508 1.670031 
Construction 1.000000 0.287353 0.352007 1.639359 1.287353 1.639359 
Manufacturing 1.000000 0.278128 0.251501 1.529629 1.278128 1.529629 
Wholesale Trade 1.000000 0.167718 0.365494 1.533212 1.167718 1.533212 
Tourism 1.000000 0.243821 0.360298 1.604119 1.243821 1.604119 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
& Other Utilities 
1.000000 0.357303 0.272612 1.629915 1.357303 1.629915 
Retail Trade 1.000000 0.160159 0.424229 1.584388 1.160159 1.584388 
Finance and 
Insurance 
1.000000 0.245945 0.168926 1.414871 1.245945 1.414871 
Services 1.000000 0.287178 0.515127 1.802305 1.287178 1.802305 
Public Admin.  1.000000 0.079677 0.631937 1.711614 1.079677 1.711614 
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Table 10   Employment Multipliers for Aggregated Industries 
Industry Direct 
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Induced 
Effects 
Total Type I 
Multiplier 
Type II 
Multiplier 
Dairy Farm 
Products 
4.656270 4.684462 3.493834 12.834565 2.006055 2.756405 
Other Agriculture 29.457531 3.846130 3.454679 36.758340 1.130565 1.247842 
All Livestock 19.610823 7.167755 3.475413 30.253991 1.365500 1.542719 
Mining 4.700518 4.434018 4.381733 13.516269 1.943304 2.875485 
Construction 9.412547 4.473122 5.383161 19.268830 1.475230 2.047143 
Manufacturing 4.180536 3.445725 3.846150 11.472412 1.824230 2.744244 
Wholesale Trade 12.355647 2.551374 5.589421 20.496442 1.206495 1.658872 
Tourism 24.835144 3.883194 5.509954 34.228292 1.156359 1.378220 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
and Other 
Utilities 
5.191341 4.442556 4.168989 13.802886 1.855763 2.658828 
Retail Trade 24.323322 2.620007 6.487642 33.430971 1.107716 1.374441 
Finance and 
Insurance 
3.798898 2.677210 2.583348 9.059456 1.704733 2.384759 
Services 20.229237 4.821697 7.877719 32.928653 1.238353 1.627775 
Public 
Administration 
20.075714 1.062073 9.664076 30.801863 1.052903 1.534285 
 
Table 11   Total Value Added Multipliers for Aggregated Industries 
Industry Direct 
Effects 
Indirect 
Effects 
Induced 
Effects 
Total Type I 
Multiplier 
Type II 
Multiplier 
Dairy Farm 
Products 
0.269925 0.122848 0.146550 0.539323 1.455119 1.998047 
Other 
Agriculture 
0.396916 0.132571 0.144907 0.674394 1.334001 1.699085 
All Livestock 0.252822 0.162517 0.145777 0.561116 1.642810 2.219410 
Mining 0.466045 0.207556 0.183793 0.857394 1.445357 1.839725 
Construction 0.400318 0.159196 0.225798 0.785312 1.397674 1.961722 
Manufacturing 0.315169 0.154363 0.161328 0.630860 1.489779 2.001657 
Wholesale Trade 0.680665 0.102021 0.234450 1.017136 1.149885 1.494327 
Tourism 0.663185 0.147704 0.231117 1.042005 1.222719 1.571214 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
and Other Utilitie 
0.521405 0.208798 0.174869 0.905072 1.400452 1.735833 
Retail Trade 0.800225 0.098219 0.272126 1.170570 1.122739 1.462801 
Finance and 
Insurance 
0.710090 0.160734 0.108359 0.979184 1.226358 1.378957 
Services 0.597518 0.176540 0.330433 1.104491 1.295455 1.848465 
Public 
Administration 
0.895647 0.044615 0.405363 1.345625 1.049814 1.502405 
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Once the output multipliers have been computed, the employment impact can 
be determined using the following equation: 
( ) YAIwW ⋅−⋅= −1 ,        (5) 
where w denotes the vector of worker coefficients, each of which is computed as the 
ratio of total number of workers employed in that sector divided by that sector’s 
output. One interpretation of the worker coefficients is that they measure the labor 
intensity of the production technology. The employment multipliers are utilized in this 
study in order to measure the impact of agroterrorism on the labor market. I note that 
underlying Eq. 5 is the assumption that output Y and employment W correlate 
perfectly, which corresponds to perfectly elastic labor supply. 
 The impact on labor income (an important component of value added) can be 
measured using a similar equation:  
 ( ) YAIlL ⋅−⋅= −1 ,        (6) 
where l denotes the vector of labor income coefficients, each of which is computed as 
the ratio of total wage bill in that sector divided by the corresponding output in that 
sector. 
SAM models have a few well-known limitations. SAM models are strictly 
linear in the formulation of economic inter-relationships, and do not allow for the 
possibility of input substitution or conservation following the agroterrorism event. 
Other criticisms include its short-term focus implied by constant prices and excess 
capacity, the non-spatial nature (unless an inter-regional SAM is built), and the fact 
that the data is often only available for administrative units (counties) which might be 
poorly defined as economic regions. Despite these limitations, the SAM model 
remains one of the most powerful economic tools used to quantify the impacts of 
regional economic shocks.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
IMPLAN DATA 
 
The regional impact model utilizes the 2000 Impact Analysis for Planning 
(IMPLAN) data for St. Lawrence County. The Minnesota IMPLAN Group (MIG)8 
collected the original data primarily from U.S. Government sources, and then 
developed the social accounting matrix suitable for regional impact analysis. The 
sources include:  
• Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Benchmark Input-Output Accounts 
of the U.S., Output Estimates, and Regional Economic Information System 
• Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey and ES-
202 (Covered Employment and Wagers Program), which details sectoral 
employment and sources of income  
• Census Bureau (CB) County Business Patterns, Decennial Census, 
Population Surveys, Economic Censuses and other surveys 
• Department of Agriculture Crop and Livestock Statistics 
• Geological Surveys 
 
IMPLAN data contain highly detailed breakdown of the production economy, 
value added, household consumption patterns, and income distribution. In the original 
database, production is disaggregated into 528 production sectors corresponding to the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).9 Value added on the other 
hand includes employee compensation, proprietary income, other property income, 
and indirect business taxes. They represent factor payments from production activities 
                                                 
8 http://www.implan.com 
9 See http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html. 
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in the form of wages to workers, profits to shareholders, rent to property owners, and 
taxes to the government. 
There are three main types of institutions in the IMPLAN data; namely 
households, enterprises (i.e., corporations), and the government. Households are 
broken down further into 9 income groups, ranging from the poorest group earning 
less than $10,000 to the highest-income group earning more than $150,000. The 
sources of household income consist of factor payments (wages, profits, and rents) as 
well as transfers from other households and incomes earned outside of the region. 
Households spend their after-tax income on consumption of both locally produced and 
imported goods, and save the remainder in their capital accounts. 
The exogenous accounts in this study are the government accounts (Federal, 
State, and Local), domestic and foreign trade. The government at various levels 
receives both indirect and direct (income) tax revenues, allocates its expenditures on 
goods and services, provides transfers and services, and saves the residuals in the 
capital account. Finally, domestic trade records transactions between local residents 
and other U.S. residents, while foreign trade records transactions between local 
residents and residents of other countries.  
The principal focus of this study is on estimating the economy-wide impact of 
an agroterrorist attack on output, employment, and value added. These are key 
regional economic indicators that are selected for different reasons; output levels 
suggest the relative importance of an industry in that region, sectoral employment 
indicates which industries are the primary job generators, and value added represents 
the breakdown of factor income between workers and owners.10 The IMPLAN model 
is used to develop the SAM model for St. Lawrence County and to structure the 
various impact scenarios. The estimated model can then be used to project economic 
                                                 
10 For more information regarding this section, see Rickman, D. and Schwer R.K. (1993). 
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losses resulting from various attack scenarios, based on the interactions between 
sectors within the region. All values are expressed in year 2000 dollars. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REGIONAL MODEL SIMULATIONS 
 
4.1    Aggregating the Data 
Performing the multiplier analysis first requires aggregation of the 528 
IMPLAN production sectors into 20 divisions using the 2002 two-digit NAICS 
classification system of the U.S. Census Bureau 
(http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/naicod02.htm) with the exception of animal 
production activities. To facilitate the impact analysis under various FMD attack 
scenarios, I have decomposed agriculture activities into (i) an “all livestock” 
classification and (ii) “other” agriculture activities using IMPLAN data from year 
2000. Table 12 describes the animal production sectors included in this “all livestock” 
group, as well as their corresponding values for output, value added, and employment 
(2000 data). This method is consistent with Ekboir (1999), which assumes that all 
susceptible species within the region of interest are affected by the outbreak. It is 
impossible to know if any particular strain of FMD would affect all or some livestock 
species following a hypothetical attack, but given the existence of high-density animal 
production, all vulnerable species are at risk and have been aggregated into a single 
sector. 
 
Table 12   “All Livestock” Sectors and Demand Values 
Industry Output Employment Employee 
Comp. 
Proprietor 
Income 
Other 
Property 
Income 
Indirect 
Business 
Taxes 
Total 
Value 
Added 
Ranch Fed 
Cattle 
5.532 70 0.554 0.368 0.153 0.117 1.192 
Range Fed  
Cattle 
0.532 7 0.053 0.039 0.014 0.010 0.116 
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Table 12   (Continued) 
Cattle 
Feedlots 
0.194 1 0.019 0.013 0.006 0.004 0.042 
Sheep, Lambs 
and Goats 
0.130 7 0.013 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.030 
Hogs, Pigs 
and Swine 
0.092 1 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.016 
Other Meat 
Animal 
Products 
0.002 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Miscellaneous 
Livestock 
4.957 137 0.226 0.226 0.263 0.048 1.495 
“All 
Livestock” 
11.438 224 1.606 0.660 0.442 0.184 2.892 
(Note: all values except for employment are in millions of dollars) 
 
Table 13   Aggregated Industry Demand Values 
Industry Industry 
Output 
Employment Employee 
Comp. 
Proprietor 
Income 
Other 
Property 
Income 
Indiret 
Business 
Taxes 
Total  
Value  
Added 
Dairy Farm 
Products 
78.047 363 10.465 7.603 2.767 0.233 21.067 
Other Agriculture 72.141 2,125 8.781 6.898 10.417 2.538 28.634 
All Livestock 11.438 224 1.606 0.660 0.442 0.184 2.892 
Mining 70.981 334 19.113 -1.385 11.276 4.077 33.080 
Construction 329.688 3,103 99.344 18.261 12.547 1.829 131.980 
Manufacturing 1,115.532 4,664 243.726 12.133 83.908 11.814 351.581 
Wholesale Trade 84.553 1,045 32.784 2.095 10.794 11.879 57.552 
Tourism 336.020 8,345 111.273 15.370 59.723 36.478 222.843 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
and Other 
Utilities 
208.250 1,081 36.533 10.496 48.524 13.029 108.583 
Retail Trade 99.012 2,408 42.928 6.032 14.914 15.357 79.232 
Finance and 
Insurance 
440.575 1,674 51.200 14.017 216.680 30.950 312.848 
Services 642.965 13,007 292.782 62.356 23.001 6.044 384.183 
Public 
Administration 
574.958 11,543 463.686 1.204 49.947 0.122 514.959 
All Sectors 4,064.161 49,915 1,414.221 155.739 544.942 134.533 2,249.435 
(Note: all values except for employment are in millions of dollars) 
 
Table 14   Household Commodity Demand for Disaggregated Income Groups 
Commodity <$5k $5-10k $10-
20k 
$20-
25k 
$25-
30k 
$30-
40k 
$40-
50k 
$50-
70k 
$70k+ 
Dairy Farm 
Products 
0.005 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 
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Table 14   (Continued) 
Other 
Agriculture 
0.868 0.771 2.083 1.977 2.708 2.725 1.220 0.694 0.286 
All Livestock 0.030 0.027 0.090 0.106 0.144 0.167 0.106 0.060 0.025 
Mining 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.001 
Construction 0.981 0.866 2.301 2.154 2.950 2.897 1.252 0.713 0.293 
Manufacturing 19.885 18.371 47.909 47.087 65.688 70.811 33.901 19.295 7.937 
Wholesale Trade 6.477 6.133 17.932 18.882 27.615 29.754 15.259 8.685 3.572 
Tourism 28.097 25.258 65.172 68.329 91.924 92.213 45.422 25.853 10.634 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
and Other 
Utilities 
9.556 8.506 19.863 20.196 25.237 27.299 12.407 7.062 2.905 
Retail Trade 3.877 4.683 10.384 11.060 16.027 17.813 8.474 4.823 1.984 
Finance and 
Insurance 
15.731 14.957 44.207 53.143 76.100 91.705 50.428 28.702 11.806 
Services 29.883 32.818 73.760 76.668 85.704 106.709 61.488 34.997 14.395 
Public 
Administration 
2.288 2.712 6.674 6.822 10.397 12.003 6.260 3.563 1.466 
All Commodities 117.683 115.110 290.389 306.440 404.512 454.114 236.226 134.453 55.304 
(Note: all values are in millions of dollars. Demands are commodity based and include 
imports) 
 
4.2    Regional Model Assumptions 
 Following aggregation, the next step is to divide the regional economy into 
endogenous and exogenous accounts. In contrast to an input-output model that 
assumes production activities to be the only endogenous variables, a SAM model is 
‘closed with respect to households,’ which means that household consumption patterns 
and income generation are deemed endogenous, which in turn requires that factor 
accounts (labor and capital) be rendered endogenous as well. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to assume that government accounts are exogenous because they are 
determined in the previous year by political forces. I also assume that St. Lawrence 
County is a ‘small open economy’ and therefore has no market power to alter its 
export demand. I assume that initially the attack is contained within the county’s 
borders, the disease does not become endemic, and the attack is a single-period event 
that is fully eradicated at the end of one year. As a corollary, I assume that in the 
short- and medium-run exporters in other countries are unable to permanently capture 
share of the foreign meat market vacated by U.S. producers following the FMD attack. 
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4.3    Impact on the International Export Market 
Following a major FMD attack, it is likely that direct impacts on livestock 
production would generate foreign export restrictions on U.S. producers. The thesis 
contributes to an emerging literature that studies the impacts of FMD on international 
livestock exports. Jensen et al. (2001) argue that any outbreak of FMD would result in 
a national halt of livestock exports for a period of one year, and Rich (2004) argues 
that the discovery of FMD in the U.S. would lead to the closure of export markets and 
impose significant costs on other sectors of the economy. These export restrictions 
would be imposed even if the outbreak were limited and only a few animals were 
infected. Other studies conclude that U.S. exports of animal products would halt 
abruptly and would not continue again for a period of six months, probably longer.11  
Blake et al. (2001) employs a model for the UK economy that imposes export 
bans for the first year following the outbreak, but assumes that by the second year the 
bans are lifted. With reference to the growing literature, my analysis assumes output 
losses for the entirety of one year following the attack, but assumes that by the 
beginning of the second year the export bans are lifted and output recovers. 
Admittedly, this is an optimistic assumption, and the simulation results should 
therefore be regarded as lower-bound estimates of the total economic impacts arising 
from production and export losses.  
Ekboir (1999) constructs an economic model in which an FMD outbreak 
reduces U.S. livestock prices by 50%, but assumes that the volume exported remains 
constant. This scenario is unlikely, since exports would presumably decline due to 
restrictions imposed by trading partners. As an alternative, I have simulated the impact 
                                                 
11 This latter estimate of the impact of FMD on U.S. exports of animal products appeared in The Voice 
of Agriculture, “Foot-and-mouth surveillance may prevent attacks,” Farm Bureau News (2001) vol. 80 
No. 19. 
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of FMD through the decline in quantity of exports, and not through the price 
mechanism. Whereas the earlier model accounts for trade losses arising entirely from 
lower export prices, my approach reflects the opposite perspective. That is, the model 
assumes that trade losses arise entirely from lower export quantity. I argue that this is 
a more plausible assumption, since trade restrictions would unambiguously curb 
agricultural export volume, while the net effect on prices appears ambiguous.  
The three agricultural cost components resulting from an outbreak of FMD 
include disposal costs, production losses, and export bans on affected animals and 
animal products. The cost estimates to be presented do not include any disposal costs. 
However, it is important to note that the cost of slaughtering and disposing of infected 
and exposed animals would represent a small percentage of the total eradication costs, 
with the greater fraction of economic losses coming from shocks to production and 
trade (Jayarao 2001). These production and trade components are the focus of my 
analysis. Production losses would result from a case of FMD due to lost production in 
depopulated areas and industries linked to the “all livestock” industry.  
Countries that have eradicated FMD impose strict sanitary restrictions on meat 
imports, resulting in a segmented market in which meat from FMD-free countries sells 
at a premium over meat from non-FMD-free countries. The international beef market 
is further segmented into FMD-free with vaccination and FMD-free without 
vaccination. WTO sanitary and phytosanitary measures permit nations coping with an 
FMD outbreak to export to nations holding FMD-free status if the products originate 
from FMD-free areas, provided the disease has been contained by way of quarantine. 
However, the likelihood of major trading partners embracing this regionalization 
principle is still unknown, and the best assumption is that the total foreign beef market 
would be closed to U.S. producers for a “substantial length of time” (Ekboir, 1999).   
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4.4   Alternative Attack Scenarios 
The economic impacts of an FMD outbreak in St. Lawrence County are 
explored under alternative attack scenarios of 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50% of total 
livestock industry output. The methodology closely parallels that of the Agri-Industry 
Modeling & Analysis Group, which produced a study on the projected economic 
impacts of an FMD outbreak in Tennessee.12  The Tennessee study, which examines 
depopulation rate scenarios at the 10%, 25%, and 50% levels, also assumes a 10% 
decline in the tourism industry. The authors cite a British Tourist Authority study that 
estimated 10% annual losses in tourism due to FMD. Using this figure as a 
benchmark, my regional model adopts a 10% decline in tourism demand in the local 
economy.  
FMD would adversely impact not only agricultural industries within St. 
Lawrence County but also tourism and related industries due to mass slaughtering, 
burning, and burying of FMD-infected animals. In addition, government response 
policies could contribute to the negative impact on the regional tourism industry. 
Government-imposed restricted access areas that include tourist attractions, historic 
sites, walking paths, waterways, and public events would exacerbate the decline in 
tourism activity. After the UK outbreak, for instance, the government closed country 
paths, zoos, parks, country houses, and roughly 70% of the inland waterway network. 
Initial estimates show that within several weeks tourism bookings declined up to 80% 
in the county of Cumbria, 60% in the county of Dumfries and Galloway, and roughly 
10% nation-wide (Blake et al. 2001). 
There have been only a few cases in which an FMD outbreak was controlled 
through vaccination alone, most notably Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2001), and 
                                                 
12 Preliminary analysis begins by assuming production losses in accordance with those assumed by 
Jensen, K. et al. “Projected Economic Impacts of a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Outbreak in 
Tennessee,” Industry Brief, AIM-AG 
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Zimbabwe (1991). All meat exports were suspended in each of these cases. There are 
several types and dozens of subtypes of the FMD virus, and vaccines must correspond 
to the exact type and subtype present in the affected region. The only proven method 
of eliminating the outbreak is total stamping-out, which would involve the use of 
vaccination to limit the spread of the outbreak, followed by depopulation of all 
infected and vaccinated livestock. It is policy of the U.S. government to destroy all 
infected and exposed animals, and a quarantine area would be enforced around the 
stamping-out area. This policy is justified primarily on economic grounds, as 
recovered animals show a decline in meat and milk productivity.  
 
4.5   U.S. Response Policy to FMD Attack 
To defend against FMD, the U.S. government has established a two-tier 
system: the first entails controlling imports and travelers at the borders, the second 
entails swift intervention and the activation of a stamping-out program following an 
FMD attack.13 Following such an event, and in accordance with APHIS guidelines, the 
U.S. would enact a stamping-out policy that would involve mass slaughter, burning, 
and burial of all infected and exposed animals, followed by extensive cleaning and 
disinfection of all exposed locations.  
The policy would also restrict the movement of animals and people and put 
controls in place to limit human access to certain area. These response measures, 
coupled with consumer fears over food safety and disease recurrence, would adversely 
impact tourism demand within St. Lawrence County. The initial attack creates direct 
effects on agriculture and also indirect effects through inter-industry linkages within 
                                                 
13 The U.S. strategy for responding to an FMD outbreak is detailed in the “Foot-and-mouth Disease 
Emergency Disease Guidelines,” published by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
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the region, but the direct effects on tourism are perpetuated not by the terrorist but by 
the government acting in response to the attack. 
Tourists might be prevented or discouraged from traveling as a result of 
quarantine enforcement measures or amid overriding fears of spreading the disease. 
The attack could diminish consumer confidence in the government’s capacity to 
regulate and maintain the food supply. Moreover, the inaccessibility of businesses 
within the restricted areas would have a major impact on rural tourism and on other 
rural businesses, as was the case of the UK outbreak in 2001. Following this outbreak, 
the cost of vaccinating all vulnerable animals was considered exorbitant, and the 
slaughter of all exposed animals was concluded to be the only viable option. Blake et 
al. (2003) performed an analysis on the impact of FMD on tourism in the UK and 
concluded that FMD had much larger adverse effects on tourism than on agriculture, 
suggesting that policy provisions take into account the roles of other sectors, such as 
tourism, when setting domestic agricultural policy. Their paper also contends that 
recent outbreaks of FMD in other countries, such as Greece in 1999, did not 
negatively impact their respective tourism industries precisely because governments 
did not close tourist amenities.  
 The 10% decline in tourism assumed in all model simulations is consistent 
with historical responses in tourism data. However, this decline could be considered a 
statistically conservative estimate of the true value, since county-level impacts might 
be higher than the national average. Although intra-regional tourism might recover 
relatively quickly after the outbreak is eradicated and movement restrictions are 
removed, inter-regional travelers and foreign visitors might be hesitant to return to 
pre-shock levels of tourism demand because the outbreak will have tarnished the 
regional and national reputation. The region would become a less appealing 
destination for tourists to visit and spend money on lodging, retail stores, and 
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entertainment due to ongoing concerns regarding food safety and the possibility of 
spreading the disease.  
 This tourism simulation is intended to be an example of how FMD might 
impact nonagricultural industries and does not mean to preclude the possibility that 
other industries could also be directly impacted. However, it is important to note that 
the impact on tourism is rather unique in the case of an FMD attack. For instance, it is 
not clear that analogous reductions in tourism demand would follow from other forms 
of agroterrorism, such as a biological attack on the milk supply14, because government 
response to such an event conceivably would not restrict the movement of people to 
the degree suggested under the FMD scenario.  
The decline in the tourism industry results not only in direct and indirect 
effects, but also induced effects on other economic activities caused by inter-industry 
linkages. The induced effects of changes in demand for tourism are generally 
quantified through SAM modeling techniques. Following the FMD attack, a mass 
slaughter in St. Lawrence County and elsewhere in the U.S. might be justified on 
purely economic grounds, as FMD causes permanent losses in meat productivity. The 
traditional international sentiment is that the disease should be swiftly eradicated, 
bringing about bans on imports of potentially FMD-infected livestock and dairy 
products.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14 This example comes from Wein and Liu (2005), which explores the possibility of terrorists spreading 
botulinum toxin through the milk supply chain. The authors construct a model that takes into account 
the various stages of the supply chain, while limiting the event to a single milk-processing plant. They 
then examine the effects of a deliberate release of botulinum toxin at key points along the supply chain, 
such as delivery trucks and raw milk silos. This type of biological attack would result in economic 
disruption, although its direct effects on tourism are less transparent than in the case of a foot-and-
mouth disease attack.  
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4.6   Tourism Classification System 
The tourism division was created through model intervention to determine 
which sectors to extract from the other divisions. Industries that depend heavily on 
sales to tourists can be expected to incur the greatest losses in output and value-added 
(Blake et al. 2001). The lower demand for tourism in the region will directly affect 
spending on hotels and lodging places, merchandise and food stores, and 
entertainment. There is scarce literature on the performance of tourism over time, 
which makes it difficult to identify with reasonable certainty the costs and benefits of 
greater resilience on the industry (Wilkerson, 2003).  
Tourism is not an industry in the traditional sense, because tourism belongs to 
a variety of sectors and no individual sector can be considered exclusively tourism. 
Because tourism generally is not given a separate industry category in economic data 
sources, the task of establishing the economic importance of tourism and measuring 
the activity of this sector can be difficult, particularly at the regional level. This thesis 
work, therefore, makes a contribution not only to the economics of terrorism literature, 
but also to the methodologies of modeling the performance of tourism following 
extreme economic events. To determine which sectors to include in the broader 
tourism classification, I will refer to the literature on the subject.  
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defines tourism in its national travel 
and tourism satellite accounts as: “the economic activity generated inside the United 
States by visitors of all types – for business and pleasure, by residents and 
nonresidents alike – and outside the United States by U.S. residents” (Okubo and 
Planting, 1998). The BEA Satellite Industry Accounts are statistical frameworks based 
on input-output accounts that allow researchers to examine a narrow focus of 
economic activity. The BEA partitions tourism goods and services into a separate 
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account, which includes: traveler accommodations, transportation (both air and other), 
food services and drinking places, recreation, entertainment, and shopping.  
A study conducted by Global Insight (2003) aggregates sectors into a Core 
Tourism Industry, composed of the following sectors: eating and drinking, hotels and 
lodging places, real estate, racing and track operation, amusement and recreation 
services, railroads and related services, air transportation, transportation services, 
automobile rental and leasing, local interurban passenger transit, automotive dealers 
and service stations, apparel and accessory stores, food stores, furniture and home 
furnishing stores, general merchandise stores, and all other.  
I have adopted the Global Insight tourism classification system for this 
analysis, which parallels the BEA tourism account and provides greater specification 
within each subcategory. I apply specific entertainment sectors to comprise the “all 
other” category. These entertainment sectors include: motion pictures, theatrical 
productions, bowling alleys and pool halls, and commercial sports. The remaining 
agricultural sectors, including dairy farm products, were aggregated into “other 
agriculture,” and the non-agricultural sectors were aggregated into divisions consistent 
with the NAICS classification system. These divisions, their corresponding IMPLAN 
sector codes, the value of industry output, and the value of industry employment are 
listed in Table 15 below. The aggregated output, employment, and value added 
statistics for the newly constructed livestock and tourism sectors are given in Table 16.  
 
Table 15   Divisions and IMPLAN Sector Codes 
Industry Name IMPLAN Sector 
Codes 
Industry 
Output* 
Industry 
Employment 
All Livestock 3-9 11.438 224 
Other Agriculture 1, 2, 10-27 150.188 2,489 
Construction 48-58 329.688 3,103 
Finance and Insurance 456-461 440.575 1,674 
Manufacturing 59-383, 389-432 1,115.532 4,664 
Mining 28-47 70.981 334 
 34
Table 15   (Continued) 
Transportation, 
Communications, and 
Other Utilities 
435, 436, 438, 439, 
441-446 
208.250 1,081 
Wholesale Trade 384-388, 447 84.553 1,045 
Public Administration 509-528 574.958 11,543 
Retail Trade 448, 455 99.012 2,408 
Services 464-476, 478-482, 
489-508 
642.965 13,007 
Tourism 433, 434, 437, 440, 
449-454, 462, 463, 
477, 483-488 
336.020 8,345 
* Millions of dollars 
 
Table 16   Economic Statistics for Aggregated Livestock and Tourism Sectors 
Industry Name All Livestock Tourism 
Total Output $11,438,000 $336,020,000 
Employment 224 8,345 
Labor Income $2,266,000 $126,643,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS OF REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Impacts of FMD on St. Lawrence County (No Direct Impact to Dairy  Industry) 
The simulation was performed under various assumptions regarding the 
severity of the FMD attack, while assuming a 10-percent tourism reduction in each 
scenario. I aggregate the dairy farm products sector into “other agriculture” to perform 
the initial simulations assuming no direct impacts to the dairy industry. I then impose 
shocks to livestock output at increasing intervals of 10 percent. These impacts 
represent alternative scenarios regarding the direct impacts and the time horizon under 
consideration. The 10% and 20% output reduction scenarios are representative of the 
immediate-term regional impacts.  
We can interpret the 50% reduction scenario as the medium-term scenario in 
which the international market has reacted to the outbreak and reduces trade volume. 
Once the international market has adjusted by banning U.S. exports, we would observe 
a larger fall in industry output. We can expect a gradual adjustment process in the 
international market, such that the response path exhibits a smoother transition among 
the various intervals instead of shifting immediately from the 10% short-term scenario 
to the 50% medium-term scenario. No attempt was made to generate long-term 
projections of the impact. The SAM model is a static economic model that assumes 
constant prices. In the long-run, however, this assumption is violated as prices change. 
With respect to this fixed price assumption I have provided only immediate and 
medium-term projections, precisely because the SAM model is invalidated under fluid 
pricing conditions. 
Note that the numbers presented are in 2000 dollars (except for employment), 
and should be interpreted as negative impacts. Labor income is equal to the sum of 
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total employee compensation and proprietary income, excluding the value added 
components of other property type income and indirect business taxes. 
 
 
Table 17   Scenario 1: 10-percent Reduction in Livestock Output, 10-percent 
Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 1,143,800 169,886 13,071 1,326,703 
Employment 22.4 3.3 0.3 26.0 
Labor Income 226,549 33,649 2,578 262,776 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 1,619,004 2,177,395 37,398,400 
Employment 834.5 40.2 54.1 928.8 
Labor Income 12,664,330 610,190 820,643 14,095,160 
All Sectors Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 34,745,800 8,543,666 12,299,125 55,588,593 
Employment 856.9 135.6 187.6 1,180.1 
Labor Income 12,890,876 3,556,169 4,867,446 21,314,492 
 
 
Table 18   Scenario 2: 20-percent Reduction in Livestock Output, 10-percent 
Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 2,287,600 320,589 13,284 2,621,472 
Employment 44.9 6.3 0.3 51.4 
Labor Income 453,097 63,498 2,631 519,226 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 1,661,268 2,221,958 37,485,220 
Employment 834.5 41.3 55.2 931.0 
Labor Income 12,664,330 626,119 837,438 14,127,880 
All Sectors Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 35,889,600 8,935,405 12,550,843 57,375,847 
Employment 879.4 142.0 191.4 1,212.8 
Labor Income 13,117,424 3,666,230 4,967,065 21,750,720 
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Table 19   Scenario 3: 30-percent Reduction in Livestock Output, 10-percent 
Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 3,431,400 471,292 13,550 3,916,242 
Employment 67.3 9.2 0.3 76.8 
Labor Income 679,646 93,347 2,684 775,677 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 1,703,536 2,266,521 37,572,060 
Employment 834.5 42.3 56.3 933.1 
Labor Income 12,664,330 642,049 854,234 14,160,610 
All Sectors Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 37,033,400 9,327,148 12,802,561 59,163,108 
Employment 901.8 148.4 195.2 1,245.5 
Labor Income 13,343,973 3,776,293 5,066,684 22,186,950 
 
 
Table 20   Scenario 4: 40-percent Reduction in Livestock Output, 10-percent 
Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 4,575,200 621,995 13,816 5,211,012 
Employment 89.7 12.2 0.3 102.2 
Labor Income 906,194 123,196 2,737 1,032,127 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 1,745,800 2,311,084 37,658,880 
Employment 834.5 43.4 57.4 935.3 
Labor Income 12,664,330 657,978 871,029 14,193,330 
All Sectors Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 38,177,200 9,718,887 13,054,279 60,950,365 
Employment 924.2 154.8 199.1 1,278.1 
Labor Income 13,570,521 3,886,355 5,166,303 22,623,178 
 
 
Table 21   Scenario 5: 50-percent Reduction in Livestock Output, 10-percent 
Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 5,719,000 772,698 14,083 6,505,781 
Employment 112.2 15.2 0.3 127.6 
Labor Income 1,132,743 153,046 2,789 1,288,578 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 1,788,064 2,355,648 37,745,710 
Employment 834.5 44.4 58.5 937.4 
Labor Income 12,664,330 673,907 887,825 14,226,060 
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Table 21   (Continued) 
All Sectors Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 39,321,000 10,110,625 13,305,997 67,737,623 
Employment 946.7 161.2 202.9 1,310.8 
Labor Income 13,797,070 3,996,416 5,265,921 23,059,407 
  
 The direct costs of the attack within the region reflect the initial output 
reductions, and the indirect costs reflect changes in inter-industry transactions as 
supplying industries react to falling demand from the directly affected industries. 
These indirect effects would include losses suffered by related industries, such as 
firms engaged in food supply, transportation, distribution, and retail. The induced 
effects capture the overall impact to household income and consumption. The total 
effects exceed the direct effects when we account for indirect and induced impacts, as 
the damage extends beyond the industries directly impacted due to the inter-industry 
supply-chain linkages within the region. The firm-level impacts of agroterrorism are 
outside the scope of this research project. 
Under the low-impact scenario presented in Table 17, the estimated total 
impact for all sectors totals over $55.5 million loss in output, 1,180 loss in local jobs, 
and $21.3 million loss in labor income. Under the high-impact scenario presented in 
Table 21, the estimated total impact for all sectors totals over $67.7 million loss in 
output, 1,310 loss in local jobs, and $23 million loss in labor income. The 
intermediate-impact scenarios are presented in tables 18 – 20. The size of the 
economic impact increases with the severity of the FMD attack. As losses in livestock 
industry output increase from 10 percent (Scenario 1) to 20 percent (Scenario 2), the 
direct effects, indirect effects, and induced effects corresponding to output, 
employment, and labor income increase accordingly.  
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Figure 3   Total Effects on Output and Labor Income in All Sectors 
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Figure 4   Ratio of Direct to Total Impact in All Sectors 
 
As losses in livestock industry output increase from 20 percent (Scenario 2) to 
30 percent (Scenario 3) the impacts of this change become more severe. Figure 2 
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illustrates this trend. Looking at the results of the FMD impacts for all sectors in 
Scenario 1, the direct effects component for output constitutes 62.5% of the total 
effect. This ratio remains relatively fixed across Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, but falls to 
58% in the medium-term outlook in Scenario 5, which is lower than the corresponding 
value for labor income. The ratio of direct to total effects for employment in all sectors 
is greater than that for output, and appears stable across all scenarios at approximately 
72%. When calculated for labor income, this ratio is lower than the same measures for 
output and employment, hovering at or below 60% in all simulations (See Figure 3). 
This result illustrates the SAM multipliers at work. Variables with greater 
corresponding multiplier values generate greater indirect and induced effects, and 
therefore the direct impact will constitute a smaller fraction of the total economy-wide 
damage.  
 
5.2   Testing for Non-Linearity 
I will now examine whether the various impacts are linearly or non-linearly 
related to the scale of the initial shock. Comparing a range of impacts between 10% 
and 50% intervals allows for statistical evaluation of the relationship between the 
initial direct impact on output and the equilibrium final impact. I test for non-linearity 
and examine whether the sectoral composition of the total impact changes as the 
output losses grow. Analysis of the impact results reveals that the various impact 
scenarios are linearly related to the scale of the initial shock for the livestock and 
tourism sectors. However, it appears that the impact on output of agroterrorism for all 
sectors is scale dependent across the highest impact scenarios.  
Although there appears to be a positive linear relationship between the direct 
and equilibrium impacts for the livestock and tourism sectors taken independently, we 
observe a non-linear relationship between the two variables for all sectors taken 
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collectively, as measured on the 10-percent interval scale. The two variables move 
together linearly across the lower impact scenarios, but move together non-linearly 
across the higher impact scenarios. In other words, the direct and equilibrium impacts 
taken for all sectors move linearly, but only in the short run. In the medium-term 
scenario of 40% to 50% loss in output, after the international market responds to the 
outbreak by imposing export bans, the equilibrium impact increases disproportionately 
faster than the direct impact. The impact on employment and labor income for all 
sectors appears strictly linear. 
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Figure 5   Test of Scale Dependence Based on Percent Change in Output for All 
Sectors in Regional Economy 
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Figure 6   Test of Scale Dependence Based on Cumulative Percent Change in Output 
for All Sectors in Regional Economy 
 
5.3   Impacts of FMD on St. Lawrence County (With Direct Impact to Dairy Industry) 
The analysis is now extended to account for impacts to the dairy industry 
following the attack, and I relax the previous assumption that dairy farm products 
remain sheltered from any direct impacts. I do so because dairy cattle are susceptible 
to infection, and the particular strain of the virus is an unknown variable in the 
simulation analysis. Therefore I assume in this section that these animals are at risk 
and render them in isolation of the “other agriculture” sector before delivering shocks 
to livestock, dairy, and tourism. I deliver equivalent shocks to livestock and dairy at 
the same 10% increment, while maintaining the 10% reduction in tourism across all 
simulations. The key economic statistics for these aggregated sectors are provided in 
Table 22, the results of the various impact scenarios under my revised assumption are 
provided in Tables 23-28, and the results across all impact scenarios are represented 
graphically in Figure 6.  I decompose the output impacts at the 20-percent reduction 
level to illustrate the effects of the attack on each major sector within the regional 
economy. 
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Table 22   Economic Statistics for Aggregated Livestock, Tourism, and Dairy Sectors 
Industry Name All Livestock Tourism Dairy  
Total Output $11,438,000 $336,020,000 $78,047,000 
Employment 224 8,345 363 
Labor Income $2,266,000 $126,643,000 $18,068,000 
 
Table 23   Scenario 6: 10-percent Reduction in Livestock and Dairy Output, 10-
percent Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 1,143,800 176,289 15142 1,335,231 
Employment 22.4 3.5 0.3 26.2 
Labor Income 226,549 34,917 2,999 264,465 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 1,822,124 2,512,684 37,936,810 
Employment 834.5 45.3 62.4 942.2 
Labor Income 12,644,330 686,744 947,010 14,298,080 
Dairy Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 7,804,700 11,206 8,006 7,823,912 
Employment 36.3 0.1 0.0 36.4 
Labor Income 1,806,718 2,594 1,853 1,811,166 
All Sectors Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 42,550,500 10,526,653 14,149,748 67,226,902 
Employment 893.3 175.2 216.4 1,284.9 
Labor Income 14,697,594 4,145,555 5,595,826 24,438,974 
 
Table 24   Scenario 7: 20-percent Reduction in Livestock and Dairy Output, 10-
percent Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 2,287,600 333,120 17,328 2,638,049 
Employment 44.9 6.5 0.3 51.7 
Labor Income 453,097 65,980 3,432 522,509 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 2,056,952 2,875,480 38,534,430 
Employment 834.5 51.1 71.4 957.0 
Labor Income 12,664,330 775,249 1,083,745 14,523,320 
Dairy Sector Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 15,609,400 17,449 9,162 15,636,010 
Employment 72.7 0.1 0.0 72.8 
Labor Income 3,613,437 4,039 2,121 3,619,597 
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Table 24   (Continued) 
All Sectors Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 51,499,000 12,860,430 16,192,770 80,552,201 
Employment 952.1 220 247.6 1,419.7 
Labor Income 16,730,861 4,832,971 6,403,784 27,967,615 
 
Table 25   Industry Output Impacts for 20-percent Reduction in Livestock and Dairy 
Output, 10-percent Reduction in Tourism 
Industry Direct 
Effects 
Indirect  
Effects 
Induced 
Effects 
Total  
Effects 
Dairy Farm Products 15,609,400 17,449 9,162 15,636,011 
Other Agriculture 0 1,765,367 50,437 1,815,804 
All Livestock 2,287,600 333,120 17,328 2,638,049 
Mining 0 82,636 66,453 149,089 
Construction 0 867,425 325,446 1,192,871 
Manufacturing 0 675,551 699,499 1,375,050 
Wholesale Trade 0 576,298 446,937 1,023,234 
Tourism 33,602,000 2,056,952 2,875,480 38,534,432 
Transportation, 
Communications, and  
0 1,547,914 1,245,991 2,793,905 
Retail Trade 0 24,505 817,626 842,131 
Finance and Insurance 0 979,860 3,569,529 4,549,390 
Services 0 3,144,934 5,054,764 8,199,698 
Public Administration 0 788,420 1,014,120 1,802,539 
Foreign Trade 0 0 0 0 
Domestic Trade 0 0 0 0 
All Sectors 51,499,000 12,860,430 16,192,770 80,552,201 
 
Table 26   Scenario 8: 30-percent Reduction in Livestock and Dairy Output, 10-
percent Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 3,431,400 489,951 19,515 3,940,866 
Employment 67.3 9.6 0.4 77.3 
Labor Income 679,646 97,043 3,865 780,554 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 2,291,780 3,238,276 39,132,060 
Employment 834.5 56.9 80.4 971.9 
Labor Income 12,664,330 863,754 1,220,480 14,748,560 
Dairy Sector Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 23,414,100 23,692 10,318 23,448,110 
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Table 26   (Continued) 
Employment 109.0 0.1 0.0 109.2 
Labor Income 5,420,155 5,484 2,388 5,428,028 
All Sectors Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 60,447,500 15,194,206 18,235,793 93,877,500 
Employment 1,010.8 264.8 278.9 1,554.5 
Labor Income 18,764,128 5,520,387 7,211,742 31,496,256 
 
Table 27   Scenario 9: 40-percent Reduction in Livestock and Dairy Output, 10-
percent Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 4,575,200 646,782 21,701 5,243,683 
Employment 89.7 12.7 0.4 102.8 
Labor Income 906,194 128,106 4,298 1,038,598 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 2,526,608 3,601,072 39,729,680 
Employment 834.5 62.7 89.4 986.7 
Labor Income 12,664,330 952,259 1,357,215 14,973,800 
Dairy Sector Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 31,218,800 29,936 11,473 31,260,210 
Employment 145.4 0.1 0.1 145.6 
Labor Income 7,226,873 6,930 2,656 7,236,459 
All Sectors Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 69,396,000 17,527,984 20,278,815 107,202,800 
Employment 1,069.6 309.5 310.1 1,689.2 
Labor Income 20,797,394 6,207,804 8,019,699 35,024,898 
 
Table 28   Scenario 10: 50-percent Reduction in Livestock and Dairy Output, 10-
percent Reduction in Tourism 
Livestock 
Sector 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 5,719,000 803,613 23,887 6,546,501 
Employment 112.2 15.8 0.5 128.4 
Labor Income 1,132,743 159,169 4,731 1,296,643 
Tourism Sector Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 33,602,000 2,761,436 3,963,868 40,327,300 
Employment 834.5 68.6 98.4 1,001.5 
Labor Income 12,664,330 1,040,763 1,493,950 15,199,040 
Dairy Sector Direct Effect  Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 39,023,500 36,180 12,629 39,072,310 
Employment 181.7 0.2 0.1 181.9 
Labor Income 9,033,591 8,375 2,923 9,044,889 
All Sectors Direct Effect Indirect Effect Induced Effect Total Effect 
Output 78,344,500 19,861,761 22,321,838 120,528,098 
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Table 28   (Continued) 
Employment 1,128.4 354.3 341.4 1,824.0 
Labor Income 22,830,661 6,895,220 8,827,657 38,553,537 
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Figure 7   Total Effects on Output and Labor Income in All Sectors, Including Direct 
Impacts to Dairy 
 
Under the low-impact scenario presented in Table 23, the estimated total 
impact for all sectors – including direct impacts to dairy – grows to over $67.2 million 
loss in output, 1,285 loss in local jobs, and $24.4 million loss in labor income. Under 
the high-impact scenario presented in Table 28, the estimated total impact for all 
sectors grows to over $120.5 million loss in output, 1,824 loss in local jobs, and $38.5 
million loss in labor income. The intermediate-impact scenarios are presented in tables 
24 – 27. As before, the size of the economic impact increases with the severity of the 
FMD attack.  
 47
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Direct Impact
R
at
io
 o
f D
ir
ec
t t
o 
To
ta
l I
m
pa
ct
 (%
)
Output
Employment
Labor Income
 
Figure 8   Ratio of Direct to Total Impact in All Sectors, Including Direct Impacts to 
Dairy 
 
In the 10% output reduction scenario, the direct effect on output for all sectors 
constitutes 63.3% of the equilibrium impact. This ratio remains relatively constant 
through Scenario 9, before falling slightly to 60.8% in Scenario 10. The ratio of direct 
to total effects for labor income is slightly lower, hovering around 60% in all 
scenarios, and this ratio for employment is slightly higher across the lower impact 
scenarios, falling steadily from 69.5% in Scenario 6 to 61.9% in Scenario 10 (See 
Figure 7).  
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPACTS ON U.S. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
6.1    Introduction to Macroeconomic Research 
The regional component presented in the initial five chapters places a valuable 
benchmark for the near-term, localized effects of the attack. However, a catastrophic 
agroterrorist attack would have major implications for U.S. financial markets. 
Considering the magnitude and importance of these markets, the losses on a national 
scale would overshadow the regional losses. By linking to the macro model following 
the regional analysis, we can examine the economy-wide impacts associated with a 
future terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture.  
Any future agroterrorist attack would involve two distinct measures of impact: 
direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs of terrorism include the value of lost 
income and productive lives, the value of buildings and infrastructure damaged or 
destroyed, and the value of disrupted commercial activity in the targeted industries. 
Much more costly, however, are the broader indirect impacts to U.S. financial markets 
estimated over several consecutive periods. The indirect impacts of terrorism can be 
significant and have the potential to affect the economy in the medium term by 
undermining consumer and investor confidence.  
This deterioration of confidence can reduce the incentive to spend as opposed 
to save, a process that can reverberate through the economy by way of normal 
business cycle and trade channels. Falling confidence may also lower asset prices and 
trigger a flight to quality that increases the borrowing costs for riskier borrowers 
(Johnston and Nedelescu, 2005). The remaining thesis chapters will focus particularly 
on the impact of terrorism on broad financial asset classes, although the procedural 
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methodology could be applied in future research to other categories of catastrophic 
shocks that are capable of generating investor unrest and uncertainty.  
Terrorist events involve unique emotional and psychological impacts that have 
shown to be significant in the short run. Communications technology allows 
information – especially negative information – to spread quickly with the potential to 
impose significant financial impacts and contagion effects in a short period of time. 
Critics argue that U.S. financial markets have shown resilience in the face of terrorist 
activity and the uncertainty surrounding corporate scandals, perpetually high crude oil 
prices, nuclear ambitions of rogue nations, and other forms of shocks to the 
international financial system. I would argue, however, that it would be shortsighted to 
overlook the negative impacts of terrorism on equity and debt capital markets simply 
because the economy has shown resilience in the past.  
I put forth the idea that financial uncertainty in the aftermath of agricultural 
terrorism has the potential to decrease consumer confidence in the future state of the 
economy, increase interest rates, increase credit spreads, dampen the stock market, and 
impact the value of the U.S. dollar relative to the currencies of trading partners. 
Indirect effects are often referred to in the literature as multiplier effects, which 
significantly increase the magnitude of losses suffered by the economy as the damage 
flows beyond the industries directly impacted. Terrorist attacks, military invasions, 
and other unexpected shocks have serious implications for financial market activity.  
A terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture via the deliberate introduction of FMD 
would adversely impact the finances of the agricultural, food processing, and food 
distribution sectors. Indirect multiplier effects would include losses suffered by related 
industries, such as firms engaged in food supply, transportation, distribution, and 
retail. These losses would be significant and potentially crippling at the micro level, 
but would be small in relation to the losses suffered to the financial markets. 
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Following a food terrorism event, we could expect to witness flight to quality and 
liquidity in the bond markets, and an increase in the value of the dollar and other 
major currencies as emerging market currencies become incrementally riskier relative 
to their risk levels in the baseline scenario.  
The loss of confidence in the safety of the food supply chain would lower 
demand for food products, in turn causing producers to curb production and 
employment, which would spill over into related sectors of the economy and reduce 
consumer demand even further. The losses are compounded due to natural lags and the 
fact that the gestation period for agricultural production is fixed. Following an FMD 
attack we would likely witness a weakening consumer and increased corporate 
bankruptcies. When information of the attack became available, investors would likely 
disengage from market commitments in search for safer financial instruments. 
The economy could experience impacts to consumer sentiment without an 
actual agroterrorist attack occurring, as long as the public perceives that an attack has 
in fact occurred.  The effects of this lost sense of security would reverberate 
throughout the economy, affecting household spending patterns and private sector 
investment behavior. Some purchases and investments would be withheld until future 
time periods, while still others would be forgone indefinitely. This event, like previous 
terrorist events, would likely pervade the public consciousness. The loss of consumer 
sentiment in the food sector would likely transfer into an overall reduction in 
consumer sentiment, which would lead to a reduction in consumer spending of all 
types, not just spending on food and food-related products. And unlike some natural 
disasters, there is no foreseeable built-in economic stimulus following a terrorist attack 
that might shorten the path to full economic recovery and mitigate the impacts on U.S. 
financial markets and regional economic performance. 
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The capabilities that the United States has accumulated for conventional, 
nation-on-nation conflict are rather ineffective at coping with terrorist threats and 
mitigating the impact of these threats on the financial system. Acts of terrorism are 
often intended to create financial uncertainty and distress. Manuel Trajtenberg (2004) 
highlights the asymmetries between terrorists and victims, and argues that the threat of 
terrorism is magnified by uncertainty. In the absence of uncertainty, an FMD attack, 
for instance, could be easily thwarted by the deployment of minor police or military 
power. This differs significantly from conventional warfare, in which accurate 
intelligence still necessitates significant military capabilities in order to overcome an 
attack. Unconventional terrorist attacks on the food supply chain constitute a relatively 
new and evolving threat that presents significant challenges. Terrorist attacks can be 
thought of as a type of disaster that occurs through the intentional actions of human 
beings. Unlike natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods, terrorist 
attacks can be targeted strategically to inflict maximum damage.15  
 
6.2 Objectives of Macroeconomic Research 
The macro analysis introduces the idea that following an agricultural terrorist 
attack the indirect costs of declining asset value, business investment, and household 
spending across the national economy would be of a much higher order of magnitude 
than the direct, micro level costs. The remaining chapters will focus on these indirect 
costs and the broader implications for U.S. financial markets. I have chosen to pursue 
                                                 
15 Although terrorists tend to act strategically, they are faced with an endowment of scarce resources 
and must allocate them not only strategically but also efficiently to maximize their utility subject to a 
budget constraint. When governments increase the costs of terrorist activity making it more difficult to 
pursue agroterrorism, there exists a motive for terrorists to substitute into other, less costly methods that 
achieve similar utility. In the case of agroterrorism, this rational actor model is applicable assuming the 
terrorist, attempting to introduce FMD, efficiently utilized his limited resources in the face of 
constraints, and responded in an efficient manner to changes in these constraints, to achieve the 
objective of attacking agriculture.  
 
 
 52
the macro cost component in depth, and different micro cost estimating factors could 
be used to complement my analysis. Researchers still know relatively little of the 
economic consequences of terrorist events. This original research is a first attempt to 
measure the impacts on broad financial asset classes resulting from a large-scale U.S. 
agroterrorist attack.  
A large amount of the investment theory detailed in the finance literature 
presupposes standard operation of the capital markets driven by normal investment 
behavior. Traditional theories of asset allocation, for instance, typically assume normal 
conditions and investment cycles in which risk profiles remain fundamentally stable. 
However, the thesis demonstrates that periods of general market uncertainty brought 
forth by extreme events such as agroterrorism will tend to disrupt the normal 
relationships among asset classes and alter investor risk preferences.  The immediate 
consequences of terrorist attacks for financial markets are predictable in that they 
increase levels of investor risk aversion. Karolyi (2006) argues that the expected 
economic impact of terrorism in the intermediate and longer term is a reduction in 
confidence, an increase in the risk aversion of consumers and firms, a decrease in 
consumption and real investment activity, an economic slowdown or recession, and a 
spillover into other stock markets, fixed income market yields, and currency markets.  
The results suggest that terrorism and other severe exogenous factors generate 
periods of investor unrest, and that this prevailing condition in turn generates 
significant impacts to asset classes in equities, fixed income, and foreign exchange. 
For instance, the spread between lower quality and higher quality corporate bond 
yields tends to widen during these times, because investors are less certain of future 
economic conditions and therefore place a higher premium on the safety, stability, and 
liquidity of investment products. High yield credit spreads tracked against the 10-year 
Treasury can indicate heightened credit concerns in the market and thus potential 
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systemic disruptions. This flight to quality implies that investors transfer funds into 
safer bonds unless they can procure higher premiums on lower-grade securities. 
Investors shift away from high-return asset classes such as equities and high yield 
bonds to intermediate-grade bonds and government bonds. Likewise, there is flight to 
safety and quality in the currency market similar to the flight to safety and quality 
observed in the fixed income market, which in turn impacts foreign exchange values. 
Although under the new conditions of financial uncertainty and economic 
distress this defensive investment strategy may be optimal, it would likely represent 
suboptimal portfolio allocation during normal times. The agricultural terrorist event 
assumed to occur in the future alters the investment landscape, leading to optimal 
investment strategies that are more conservative. Over the long run this defensive 
investment strategy offers lower returns on investment, lower aggregate incomes, and 
lower economic growth rates relative to baseline projections. This theory is supported 
by the simulation results to be presented in Chapter 10, which provide real estimates 
of lower economic growth rates relative to baseline projections in the macro model. 
Originating from a large open economy model, I impose exogenous shocks on 
key sectors of the macro economy: consumer sentiment, the S&P 500 stock index, 10-
year Treasury yields, Aaa – 10-year Treasury yield spreads, Baa – Aaa yield spreads, 
the value of the dollar against currencies of major trading partners, and the value of 
the dollar against currencies of other important trading partners. When adversely 
impacted, each of these parameters in the Global Insight macro model contributes to 
the overall projected decline in real GDP growth. The strategy focuses on adjustments 
in these markets based on a macro view of economic, political, and business factors. 
Instead of assessing the impacts on individual securities, this top-down approach 
captures shocks in key financial variables. 
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At the micro level, the success of the firm is generally tied to the health of the 
macro economy. Therefore, impact analysis must account for the general business 
environment in which the firm operates. For many firms in different industries, shocks 
to the broader economy have a greater effect on profits than the firm’s relative 
performance within its industry. Furthermore, research has shown that the level of the 
broad market and aggregate earnings trend together. It makes sense, then, for a top-
down analysis of the impacts of agricultural terrorism to consider macro factors and 
the impacts on financial markets. In previous chapters we operated within a regional 
framework in order to explore the costs of agroterrorism in terms of output, 
employment, and value added for key sectors within a regional economy of interest. 
Here we do the same, except that the region is defined as the national economy of the 
United States, and the cost of the attack is defined as the total loss in national output.  
I note that the projected adjustments in these financial variables are slight, and 
none of the alternative attack simulations forecast an oncoming recession. However, in 
the context of a $12 trillion U.S. economy, slight changes in key financial variables 
can result in significant cumulative current value dollar losses. Furthermore, the losses 
in national economic output are never fully recovered, even though the results will 
show that the real GDP growth rate recovers by the third quarter of 2007 following a 
hypothetical terrorist attack assumed to occur at the beginning of the third quarter of 
2005. The macro results section will demonstrate that a period of increased financial 
uncertainty brought forth by a future agroterrorist event can be expected to cause a 
negative deviation in real GDP growth rates from baseline growth rates, and this 
deviation, although slight, proves very costly in terms of lost output. The expected 
shift to lower-return investments offers lower aggregate income and output, which 
translates into lower real GDP growth rates.  
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The event is assumed to occur during the summer of 2005, with baseline and 
post-shock simulations performed through 2010. The difference between projected 
real GDP in the post-shock and baseline scenarios is the measure of the total national 
economic cost of the event. I present only short-term real GDP impacts. No attempt 
was made to model long run changes in productivity growth, such as rising costs of 
transactions through increased security measures or higher insurance premiums. The 
focus of this study is on the broader costs of an agroterrorism event that impacts U.S. 
financial markets, and is not industry or firm specific. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DESCRIPTION OF MACRO DATA 
 
7.1 Global Insight Macroeconomic Model 
The data for the model are taken from the detailed Global Insight U.S. 
Macroeconomic Model, which is a 1,200-equation model of the U.S. economy. The 
model is solved iteratively to generate the results of the post-shock scenario. The 
model depicts the economic behavioral processes and interactions of households, 
firms, and governments. Major aggregate demand components of the model include 
consumption, investment, and government purchases. Consumer purchases are divided 
into three separate categories: durable goods, nondurable goods, and services.  
Expenditures on durable goods are sensitive to consumer sentiment, household 
net worth, and current finance costs. The exchange rate component of the model is 
sensitive to international differences in inflation, trade deficits, interest rates, and 
capital flows between the U.S. and its competitors. Short run and long run interest 
rates are represented in the model, and they constitute the main output of the financial 
sector. Aggregate supply is estimated by a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
combining increases in total factor productivity with growth in factor inputs. Trend 
technological change and R&D stock are the key factors that determine total factor 
productivity. Again, however, no attempt was made to model the impacts on total 
factor productivity, and the add-factors associated with this variable remain fixed in all 
simulations. Inflationary expectations impact consumption through the consumer 
sentiment parameter, while expectations of future economic growth rates impact 
business investment.    
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7.2    University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey 
The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is the item employed in 
the Global Insight model that measures public confidence in the U.S. economy. The 
index is based on a telephone survey with a sample size of 500, and survey results are 
indexed for the national economy as a whole, as well as for four separate regions: 
north central, north east, south, and west. A preliminary mid-month release is based on 
roughly two-thirds of the full sample of interviews. The survey consists of five 
questions. Two of the five questions ask respondents to assess present economic 
conditions, and the remaining three questions ask respondents to provide their 
expectations of future economic performance. The level of the present conditions 
component relates to the level of economic activity, whereas the expectations 
component relates to the rate of economic growth.  
The expectations sub-index is a component of the composite index of leading 
economic indicators. The Michigan survey asks respondents about their intent to 
purchase big-ticket household items and asks about changes in the respondent’s own 
financial situation. Unlike the Conference Board’s consumer confidence survey, which 
closely tracks labor market conditions, the Michigan survey does not account for 
employment outlook. The apparent rule of thumb is that a one-point movement in the 
Michigan index is equivalent to a two-point movement in the Conference Board 
index.16 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 For more information regarding the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey, refer to 
Ludvigson, Sydney C. (2004), “Consumer Confidence and Consumer Spending.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE KEYNESIAN MODEL 
 
The theoretical model underlying my analysis was first specified by Cho and 
Moreno (2003). The model examines the impact of exogenous shocks in the context of 
a New Keynesian macroeconomic model. The IS or demand equation is based on 
representative agent utility maximization with external habit persistence. The effects 
of structural shocks are recovered from the model solution and changes to the macro 
variables are then interpreted. Because of the time series restrictions implied by the 
model, a close relationship is established between the equation parameters and 
changes in the macro variables due to global uncertainty following financial shocks. 
The IS or demand equation explains the demand side of the economy, derived 
from a representative agent model presented in the literature by Fuhrer (2000), who 
focuses on consumption expenditures for non-durable goods and services. He argues 
that if the sources of gradual responses to economic shocks are not captured in 
adjustment costs or in a fuller accounting of uncertainty, then what is needed is a 
reexamination of the specification of the utility function. The utility function is 
represented as 
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Current utility, tU , depends on current consumption, tC , relative to the habit 
reference level, or lagged consumption. The parameter γ  indexes current consumption 
to lagged consumption. Because the utility function allows for consumers who form 
slowly adjusting habits, the implications are slower responses to major changes in 
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macroeconomic conditions. Because of assumed consumption smoothing behavior, 
both the level and the change in consumption will adjust slowly in response to shocks 
to interest rates or income. We can rewrite the utility function from (1) into the 
following: 
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where tC denotes the level of consumption, tH denotes the external level of habit, and 
σ denotes the inverse of the elasticity of substitution. By saying the level of habit is 
external implies that it does not factor in as an argument for utility maximization. The 
budget constraint is represented as 
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The budget constraint suggests that the representative agent has a level of 
consumption, tC , plus a value of present asset holdings, tB , that cannot exceed the 
endowment level. This endowment level is derived from labor income, tW , and the 
real value of asset holding held at the start of the period, 1
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nominal gross return on the assets, tR . Maximizing the utility function from (2) 
subject to the budget constraint from (3), the Euler equation can be represented as 
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where ψ  is the time discount factor and P is the price level. By assuming joint 
lognormality of consumption and price, we can derive the following: 
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The national income identity is represented as follows: 
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where tY  represents aggregate supply and tG  represents the remaining components of 
aggregate demand: investment, government expenditures, and net exports. Taking logs 
yields ttt zyc += * , where ty *  is the log of gross domestic product and 
)log(
t
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Y
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−= . Let tTtt yyy +=* , where Tty represents the potential output element 
of ty *  and ty  is the output gap. Thus, equation (5) is transformed into the following 
expression:  
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ttt yzyzEyzg −−++ +−++++−= μμ . As tg  increases, ty  
increases, and as tg  decreases, ty  decreases. By defining tg Eg=α , where E 
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represents the unconditional expectation operator, the demand side of the economy is 
represented by the following IS equation: 
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             (8) 
 
where gcIS ααα += and gttIS g αε −=, . Utilizing this theoretical representation, we 
can interpret tIS ,ε  as an exogenous shock to aggregate demand. Notice that a positive 
shock increases ty , whereas an adverse shock decreases ty . Although the last term in 
equation (8) captures impacts to aggregate demand, it does not specify or measure 
shocks to the individual demand components. We would expect the agroterrorist 
attack to impact various demand components in reduced form, including consumer 
sentiment, interest rates, and foreign exchange values. Returning to equation (6), we 
can improve model specification by expanding the market clearing condition into the 
individual demand components, such that 
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Where 
C = Consumption, I = Business Investment, G = Government expenditures, X = 
Exports, M = Imports, (X-M) = Net Exports, and NFI = Net Foreign Investment 
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Where 
Y = National Income, T = Taxes, r = the real rate of interest, and FX = foreign 
exchange value of the dollar 
The parameters ,,, 00 eia  and 0n  represent shifters that influence consumption, 
domestic investment, international trade, and foreign investment, respectively. The 
consumption demand shifter can be shown as some combination of consumer 
sentiment and consumer wealth components. The a term in the aggregate consumption 
function can be decomposed into  
ZaWWaCSCSaaa z+++++= 22110 αα , allowing us to rewrite consumption as 
)(22110 TYbZaWWaCSCSaaC z −++++++= αα     
           (10) 
The CS term represents consumer sentiment, W represents consumer wealth, 
and Z represents a vector of other consumer demand shifters. The 1α  parameter is 
interpreted as the add factor specific to consumer sentiment, and the 2α parameter is 
interpreted as the add factor specific to consumer wealth. Shocks were similarly 
imposed to interest rates, the stock market, and the value of the dollar by adjusting the 
add factors specific to these model parameters. Thus, we can interpret exogenous 
shocks on aggregate demand as negative adjustments to independent variable add-
factors.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
9.1 Historical Events Database 
The first step involved assembling enough data series to determine what a 
normal response to an agroterrorist attack would be. The data series could then be used 
to obtain an impulse response function that describes how the variables move over 
time. This approach offers a main contribution to modeling impacts of terrorism on 
key financial variables. Whereas other approaches focus on estimating micro-level 
costs of terrorism starting with individual firms and agents, the methodology 
employed here starts with larger aggregates and allows for the broader estimation of 
the macroeconomic impacts.  
The methodology becomes extremely useful in imposing exogenous shocks on 
various parameters in the econometric model. The difficulty arises in attempting to 
quantify the magnitude and duration of such shocks. The magnitudes of the changes in 
the add factors, and in turn the independent variables, were determined by compiling 
an historical database of observed events. Within the event study methodology, I 
examine the capital market response to a set of historical terrorist and military attacks. 
This is essentially the standard event study test to determine whether the capital 
markets experienced significant abnormal returns in response to any of the historical 
events (Chen and Siems, 2004). 
Although the United States has not previously experienced a catastrophic 
attack on its food supply system, the country has experienced previous destabilizing 
terrorist and geopolitical events that were of a similar nature to the hypothetical event 
studied in this analysis. These events were of a national scale, and brought forth 
periods of financial uncertainty that influenced the movement of large macro 
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variables. The historical response of these variables can be leveraged to model the 
typical market response to a U.S. agroterrorism event, in terms of both depth of shock 
and response path. Determining which events to include requires a somewhat 
subjective decision-making process. The set is restricted to transnational events, or 
shocks, that generated financial impacts and exhibited traceable responses. Although 
the list is subjectively determined, I selected events from the Significant Terrorist 
Incidents list released by the U.S. Department of State (2001), and also included major 
military shocks that were unexpected and resulted in geopolitical instability.  
Domestic acts of terrorism typically do not demonstrate measurable impacts in 
large financial data sets, and are therefore excluded from consideration. For example, 
right wing acts of domestic terrorism, such as anti-abortion bombings, and left wing 
acts of domestic terrorism, such as environmental terrorism, are relatively minor and 
typically do not generate measurable impacts on large investment variables. They also 
seem to produce different impacts on investor psychology and market behavior 
relative to major geopolitical shocks, and likely originate from a different distribution 
than the set of shocks appropriate for this analysis. The chosen set of events was 
further broken down into categories of major events and lesser events in order to allow 
calculations of mean impacts for the three major events and for all events taken in 
sum. 
The major events include the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the Iranian Embassy hostage incident that 
began on November 4, 1979. The impacts of the 2001 anthrax attacks are captured in 
the 9/11 observation, having occurred shortly after 9/11 and having been perceived by 
the general public as extensions of 9/11. The anthrax attacks illustrate the point that 
even minor cases of biological attacks that result in only a few cases of illness or death 
can still cause psychological damage and increasing levels of financial uncertainty. 
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The three lesser events include the first bombing of the World Trade Center on 
February 26, 1993, the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 
7, 1998, and the attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole on October 12, 2000.  
The data values in the events database are drawn from different years, ranging 
from 1979 to 2001. Because the data values for the events originate from different 
base levels, the impact estimates are given as cumulative monthly percent changes in 
the financial variables. Presented in tables 29-34 are cumulative monthly mean 
changes and standard deviations associated with all six events post-shock, which were 
determined on a monthly basis for a period of 12 consecutive months. These average 
monthly percent changes were then converted into quarterly cumulative percent 
changes from the base month. The base month was considered to be the month in 
which the shock occurred, and was given a value of t = 0. The first month after the 
shock was labeled t + 1, the second t + 2, and so on.  
Adjustments had to be made for events occurring early in the month. I 
hypothesize that the 9/11 attacks, for example, occurred sufficiently early in the month 
for the t + 1 impacts to be captured in September rather than October. This hypothesis 
is supported by the empirical data. Thus, a rule was imposed on the data such that any 
event occurring on or before the 15th of the month would be shifted back one month to 
better align the t + 1 values. The September 11, 2001 event has associated with it a 
month t + 1 percent change, which according to the rule reflects the percent change in 
the data from August to September. The same adjustments were made to all of the six 
events, with the exception of the first World Trade Center bombing which occurred 
toward the end of the month. 
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Table 29   Consumer Sentiment: average monthly cumulative percent change from 
base month 
Months 
After shock 
Mean 
Impact (%) 
Standard  
Deviation 
1 -4.12 6.49 
2 -5.07 7.12 
3 -8.15 11.21 
4 -6.36 10.42 
5 -10.60 9.98 
6 -11.36 9.39 
7 -9.24 10.25 
8 -3.57 6.86 
9 -3.42 7.44 
10 -1.95 8.80 
11 0.83 12.29 
12 -0.94 14.08 
 
Table 30   S&P 500: average monthly cumulative percent change from base month 
Months 
After shock 
Mean 
Impact (%) 
Standard  
Deviation 
1 -5.12 4.90 
2 -5.94 6.40 
3 -5.33 7.79 
4 -2.25 8.06 
5 -3.10 5.67 
6 -4.35 9.65 
7 -0.93 9.43 
8 1.63 9.42 
9 2.72 12.46 
10 1.99 14.90 
11 0.76 18.20 
12 -0.94 14.08 
 
 
Table 31 Value of the dollar versus currencies of major trading partners: average 
monthly cumulative percent change from base month 
Months 
After shock 
Mean 
Impact (%) 
Standard  
Deviation 
1 0.08 1.72 
2 -1.20 2.46 
3 -2.53 3.42 
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Table 31   (Continued) 
4 -2.38 3.47 
5 -0.99 4.17 
6 -0.74 4.86 
7 -1.39 4.65 
8 -0.59 3.27 
9 -0.40 3.10 
10 -0.39 3.10 
11 -0.80 3.14 
12 -0.76 2.52 
 
 
Table 32   Value of the dollar versus currencies of other important trading partners: 
average monthly cumulative percent change from base month 
Months  
After shock
Mean 
Impact (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 1.26 0.35 
2 2.36 1.22 
3 2.90 1.27 
4 3.71 2.29 
5 4.57 3.02 
6 5.66 3.29 
7 6.37 3.77 
8 6.89 4.45 
9 7.42 5.28 
10 8.14 5.79 
11 9.74 9.11 
12 10.82 9.81 
 
 
Table 33   10-year treasury yield: average monthly cumulative percent change from 
base month 
Months  
After shock
Mean 
Impact (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 -0.97 3.63 
2 -3.36 6.13 
3 -4.81 8.13 
4 -0.90 11.83 
5 -2.25 13.97 
6 -5.47 9.86 
 68
Table 33   (Continued) 
7 -6.07 7.48 
8 -5.10 6.31 
9 -4.08 4.94 
10 -2.30 6.45 
11 -1.89 9.99 
12 -3.27 12.18 
 
Table 34   Average Aaa – Baa corporate credit spread (bps) 
Months 
after shock 
Mean 
Impact 
(bps) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(bps) 
1 89 27 
2 95 26 
3 105 24 
4 112 32 
5 125 52 
6 122 52 
7 117 52 
8 104 36 
9 102 32 
10 107 38 
11 106 46 
12 102 38 
 
9.2 Methodology for Imposing Shocks on the Model 
Imposing shocks on the baseline forecast did not require adjustments to the 
model equations, but rather adjustments to the appropriate model add-factors. In 
estimating large-scale econometric models, the estimated value of a single variable for 
the most recent time period often differs from what is observed in that same period. To 
provide a better fit with the most recent observed data, an add factor is used, which is 
a type of exogenous variable that is specific to the relevant explanatory variable. The 
adjusted value of the add factor enters the value of the parameter which enters the 
model.  
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A terrorism scenario was created after intervening in the baseline forecast and 
adjusting the projected baseline add-factors for the appropriate variables in the Global 
Insight model. The add factor adjustments were based on the mean shock values 
presented in the previous section, and were delivered to four separate sectors of the 
national economy: consumer sentiment, the S&P 500 stock price index, interest rates, 
and the foreign exchange value of the dollar. Within the fixed income asset class, 
interest rate add-factor adjustments were made to the 10-year treasury yield, the Aaa 
corporate yield, and the Baa corporate yield. Foreign exchange add-factor adjustments 
were made to the value of the dollar versus major trading partners and to the value of 
the dollar versus other important trading partners.  
         
Table 35   Baseline add-factors for key financial variables 
 Consumer 
Sentiment 
S&P 500 
 
Aaa 
Corporate 
Baa 
Corporate 
10-year 
Treasury 
For. Ex. 
MTP 
For. Ex. 
OITP 
2005Q2 -0.814997 258.8427 0.099006 0.139010 0.673820 0.102063 0.091112 
2005Q3 0.000191 265.6267 0.268159 0.291509 0.329724 0.092432 0.099947 
2005Q4 0.000128 245.9663 0.309741 0.330808 0.299710 0.114553 0.118804 
2006Q1 -0.000460 219.5573 0.327544 0.309470 0.279788 0.125430 0.131509 
2006Q2 0.000261 217.0730 0.295624 0.283563 0.242957 0.136720 0.134248 
2006Q3 -0.000608 231.0709 0.258686 0.254552 0.245329 0.145725 0.135699 
2006Q4 -0.000602 241.4864 0.266339 0.242877 0.230217 0.154464 0.134981 
2007Q1 0.000179 253.3121 0.245010 0.244870 0.140537 0.155102 0.134528 
2007Q2 0.000487 238.5255 0.306854 0.279747 0.171399 0.163405 0.134597 
 
Table 36   Post-shock add-factors for key financial variables 
 Consumer 
Sentiment 
S&P 500 Aaa 
Corporate
Baa 
Corporate
10-year 
Treasury 
For. Ex. 
MTP 
For. Ex. 
OITP 
2005Q2 -0.814997 258.8427 0.099006 0.139010 0.673820 0.102063 0.091112 
2005Q3 -5.079917 354.0000 0.470000 0.301300 0.271660 0.100000 0.120000 
2005Q4 -8.297408 305.0000 0.400000 0.376300 0.163460 0.120000 0.160000 
2006Q1 -4.755153 279.0000 0.347500 0.354000 0.180000 0.130000 0.200000 
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Table 36   (Continued) 
2006Q2 -0.824476 277.0000 0.371000 0.316200 0.207000 0.140000 0.240000 
2006Q3 -0.000608 267.0000 0.365000 0.278900 0.220000 0.145725 0.220000 
2006Q4 -0.000602 257.0000 0.360000 0.261100 0.230217 0.154464 0.200000 
2007Q1 0.000179 247.0000 0.345000 0.256500 0.140573 0.155102 0.180000 
2007Q2 0.000487 238.5255 0.356800 0.285400 0.171399 0.163405 0.160000 
 
The add factors for each parameter were adjusted for four consecutive quarters, 
then tapered, as necessary, to gradually bring the model back in line with baseline add 
factor estimates within eight quarters of the terrorist attack. The tapering method was 
used in order to provide a smoother transition and to eliminate large, sequential 
adjustments to the subsequent baseline add-factor. The attack is assumed to occur at 
the beginning of the third quarter of 2005, and the simulation continues through 2010, 
at which point the model appears to settle into long-run equilibrium.  
The total economic losses are the difference in projected real GDP in the 
baseline and attack scenarios, excluding specific impacts on the food industry. The 
top-down model used in this analysis represents an aggregate model of the entire 
national economy and predicts economic behavior from statistically estimated 
relationships among variables in the past. The model has been estimated from actual 
macroeconomic behavior, and reflects the short-term costs of increased financial 
uncertainty surrounding an unexpected terrorist attack. The post-shock simulation 
generates a predicted economic impact with reference to the baseline scenario, 
measured as the percent change in real GDP in future years.17  
                                                 
17 This approach quantifies post-shock GDP against a counterfactual (baseline real GDP forecast) based 
on individual observations that do not themselves utilize counterfactual estimation techniques. 
Alternatively, future research could measure each individual historical event against an estimated 
counterfactual (i.e. time trend variable) prior to measuring the aggregate mean against the baseline 
counterfactual. Thus, two sets of counterfactuals could be employed rather than one. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
RESULTS OF MACRO ANALYSIS 
 
10.1 Specifying the Magnitude of the Shock 
The figures that follow show the monthly percent changes in the independent 
variables over time. Notice that we typically observe a negative reaction to the shock, 
followed by a return to pre-shock levels within one year. Also notice that the mean 
curve for the major events tracks the mean curve for all events very closely. The depth 
of the shock varies somewhat from event to event, and the response path returns 
quickly in some cases while more slowly in others. But looking at the mean values, we 
can see that recovery generally takes approximately 12 months, at which point the 
variables have returned to pre-shock levels. Consumer sentiment, the S&P 500, the 
interest rate variables, and the value of the dollar against currencies of major trading 
partners are all consistent with this pattern. The value of the dollar against currencies 
of other important trading partners, however, continues to increase over the entire 12-
month period.  
The University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index, depicted in Figure 
10, fell steadily after the first six months of the attack, and then returned to pre-shock 
levels within 12 months. The events included in the “Big 3” sub-index showed 
different individual responses, but the mean curve is relatively smooth. Consumer 
sentiment was surprisingly resilient following 9/11, returning to pre-shock levels 
within 5 months. The curve representing the Kuwait invasion shows that consumer 
sentiment fell roughly 30 percentage points within only 3 months following the shock, 
and required 8 months to reach pre-shock levels. Moreover, the initial recovery to the 
Kuwait invasion was quite slow, averaging at most one-percentage point recovery per 
month between months 3 and 6. Indeed, most of the recovery in consumer sentiment 
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post-shock occurs between months 7 and 8. Previous research found that the decline in 
consumer sentiment associated with the Kuwait invasion helped predict subsequent 
weakness in consumer spending.18  
Consumer sentiment following the U.S.S. Cole attack did not fully recover to 
pre-shock levels within 12 months, and similarly, consumer sentiment following the 
Kuwait invasion remained below pre-shock levels for eight consecutive months. 
Consumer optimism or pessimism concerning the present and future state of the 
overall economy is an important factor behind the level of economic performance. For 
instance, if consumers have lower confidence in their future levels of income, they 
may be less inclined to purchase big-ticket household items. Sentiment over the future 
state of the economy influences how much consumption and production will be sought 
and impacts aggregate demand for economic goods and services.  
The first two figures show the value of the national consumer sentiment index 
across all years relevant to the data set, and provide evidence that the response path is 
strongly driven by the event and not by overall economic conditions. By inspection, 
we notice sharp breaks in the data following the event; often the variable is trending 
upward prior to the event and trending downward immediately following the event. 
And in those cases when the variable may be trending downward prior to the event, 
we observe an increase in the rate of this trend, suggesting the event is a contributing 
factor, if not the primary factor, behind the observed decline in value. The same 
pattern is evident in the stock market values presented in Figure12, and in the credit 
spread values presented in Figures 16 and 17. 
                                                 
18 For a more detailed analysis of the link between consumer sentiment and consumer spending, refer to 
Throop, Adrian W. (1992), “Consumer Sentiment: Its Causes and Effects.” Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco Economic Review 
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Figure 9   Historical Consumer Sentiment Index Values: 1979-1995 
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Figure 10   Historical Consumer Sentiment Index Values: 1995-2002 
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Figure 11   Monthly percent change in consumer sentiment index post-shock 
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Figure 12   Monthly consumer sentiment values (indexed to 100) 
 
Negative abnormal stock returns are analyzed using the S&P 500 composite 
stock index. In Figure 13, the S&P 500 appears to react negatively in the first six 
month following the shocks, which is similar to the results observed for consumer 
sentiment. Looking at the mean values for the “Big 3” major events, the stock market 
is down almost 7 percent during the first three months post-shock. The market 
 75
recovers slightly after a six-month period, down more than 4 percent from pre-shock 
levels. After 12 months the market shows no lingering signs of negative reaction, and 
has returned to pre-shock levels. The mean line taken for all six events shows 
approximately the same reaction. The Kuwait invasion event follows the mean values 
most closely during months 7 through 12. The stock market following 9/11 was down 
almost 7 percentage points after 6 months. 
This research project focuses on a hypothetical attack that is unanticipated by 
the market. The value of the stock market serves as an informative measure of the 
economic impact of agroterrorism. Stock prices reflect the expected future gains of a 
company, and also reflect expectations that those gains materialize (Frey and 
Luechinger, 2004). Both of these would be impacted by terrorism. First, expected 
profits would fall if anti-terrorism security measures increase production costs. 
Second, a future terrorist attack would increase uncertainty about future market 
prospects, which could potentially lead to a higher risk premium. As the economy 
recovers from the attack, the market would recognize large earning increases, in turn 
leading to higher stock prices.  
In theory, bearish strategists might recommend industries with below-average 
sensitivity to the business cycle. Defensive investments likely would be pursued in 
lieu of higher growth opportunities in order to outperform the market during the 
economic slowdown. It is likely that we would observe a shift from small to large 
capitalization asset classes, as large-cap stocks typically outperform during periods of 
uncertainty. Although small and mid-cap stocks offer higher growth rates than large 
domestic stocks, the former would likely under perform if the U.S. economy slows 
following the agroterrorist attack. However, estimating shifts between individual stock 
classifications is not examined in this study, and the impact to the equity asset class is 
captured within the post-shock S&P 500 add-factor value. Figure 12 shows the 
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historical value of the S&P 500 with logarithmic trend line from 1990 to 2001. The 
market declines immediately following each of the events depicted.  
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Ja
n-
90
Ju
l-9
0
Ja
n-
91
Ju
l-9
1
Ja
n-
92
Ju
l-9
2
Ja
n-
93
Ju
l-9
3
Ja
n-
94
Ju
l-9
4
Ja
n-
95
Ju
l-9
5
Ja
n-
96
Ju
l-9
6
Ja
n-
97
Ju
l-9
7
Ja
n-
98
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Date
S&
P 
50
0 
In
de
x 
Va
lu
e
Kuwait
Embasssy
Cole
     9/11
 
Figure 13   Historical S&P 500 Index Values: 1990 – 2001  
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Figure 14   Monthly percent change in S&P 500 stock price index post-shock 
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Figure 15   Monthly S&P 500 stock prices post-shock (values indexed to 100) 
 
The Aaa corporate – 10-year Treasury spread did not noticeably change; 
however, Figures 16-19 show that the Baa-Aaa corporate spread did widen sharply, 
reflecting a movement from lower quality to higher quality credits during the post-
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shock period of uncertainty. As Figure 19 illustrates, credit spreads remained stable in 
the months immediately prior the attack, and then increased sharply for the first two 
quarters post shock. As the macro economy slows following the attack, yield spreads 
will tend to widen. Investors perceive a higher probability of corporate bankruptcy 
when economic growth declines, even assuming bond ratings remain fixed, because 
investors demand a commensurately higher default premium measured by the 
difference between the promised yield on a corporate bond and the yield on a risk-free 
asset. 
This result is more pronounced in the curve representing mean values for the 
“Big 3” events, which suggests that a more serious attack would impact credit spreads 
more significantly. Bond managers would likely lower the term of bond portfolios in 
the presence of general market uncertainty and higher projected interest rates. With the 
economy weakened, corporate profits in aggregate would be expected to decline and 
bond managers would likely decrease portfolio exposure to lower-grade corporate 
bonds because such bonds would exhibit deteriorating credit worthiness during the 
post-shock period. The thesis relates to several studies in the literature, such as 
Krishnamurthy (2002) and Longstaff (2004) that demonstrate widening spreads 
between illiquid and liquid assets during episodes of flight to quality. Gatev and 
Strahan (2006) argue that during these periods investors shift from riskier assets such 
as commercial paper toward safe assets such as bank deposits. Other studies, including 
Stock and Watson (1989) and Friedman and Kuttner (1993) show that widening credit 
spreads are a leading economic indicator for business cycle downturns.  
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Figure 16   10-year treasury and corporate bond yields from 1979-2002 
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Figure 17   Baa-Aaa credit spread (bps) from 1979-1995 
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Figure 18   Baa-Aaa credit spread (bps) from 1995-2002 
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Figure 19   Baa-Aaa corporate interest rate spreads (bps) post-shock 
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Figure 20   Average Baa-Aaa credit spreads (bps) over 6-month post-shock period 
 
The U.S. 10-year Treasury note has become the security that is most often 
quoted when examining the performance of the government bond market and is used 
to express the longer-term expectations of future macroeconomic activity. It is also 
significant to the mortgage market, which uses the yield on the 10-year Treasury note 
as a benchmark for establishing mortgage interest rates. Bond ratings measure the 
quality of the bond, based on the debt issuer’s financial condition and the extent to 
which the issuer will be able to meet interest and principal repayments. Investment 
grade bonds are considered high-quality bonds and typically have the smallest amount 
of risk and lower corresponding rates of interest.  
Intermediate-grade bonds have good short-term security but increasing risk as 
the bond matures, and thus the issuer pays a higher interest rate. Aaa corporate bonds 
are deemed to be the best quality and carry the smallest amount of investment risk. 
Interest payments on these bonds are protected by a stable margin and secure 
principal. Baa corporate bonds are deemed medium-grade obligations, and they are 
neither highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest payments and principal security 
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associated with Baa bonds are often sufficient in the near term, but certain risk 
protections may be inadequate over longer periods of time.19 
Financial market variables often contain useful information to help predict real 
economic activity. This information is readily accessible, and the variables are quite 
reliable, because market players base investment decisions on their forecasts of 
economic activity.20 Saito and Takeda (2000) use empirical studies to find that the 
yield spread of corporate bonds is a better predictor of future economic activity than 
government bonds. They also suggest that given the relatively stable credit risk 
premium observed in corporate bond yields, more emphasis should be given to the 
information present in the yield spread of corporate bonds for future economic 
activity.  
The authors argue that although the theoretical background for the predictive 
power of the yield spread is not clear, there tends to be a flight to quality during 
periods of crisis and uncertainty. During such times, investors shift away from high-
return asset classes such as equities and high yield bonds to intermediate-grade bonds 
and government bonds. The investment performance of equities and higher-yielding 
bonds is variable on a monthly basis, but the returns exceed those offered in high-
quality fixed income investments. Bonds would represent attractive wealth 
preservation vehicles that would enable investors to receive stable income in a 
declining market environment following the agroterrorist attack. 
In addition to the impact on fixed income asset classes, Figure 20 shows that 
instead of strengthening, the value of the dollar versus currencies of major trading 
partners actually weakens slightly. The curve representing the mean values for all six 
                                                 
19 The two main services that rate bonds are Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. The ratings systems are 
similar but are given different letter codes. 
20 This notion is covered in detail by Kozicki, Sharon (1997), “Predicting Real Growth and Inflation 
with the Yield Spread,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review. 
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events follows a similar shock pattern to the Kuwait event, although muted in depth. 
Following the attack, the U.S. market becomes a somewhat riskier investment relative 
to baseline conditions, thus improving the relative attractiveness of foreign markets 
and currencies of major trading partners. In addition to the U.S. dollar, the Federal 
Reserve refers to seven of the 26 broad index currencies as “major” currencies. These 
include the euro, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, British pound, Swiss franc, 
Australian dollar, and Swedish krona. The remaining 19 currencies are referred to as 
“other important trading partners” of the United States. 
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Figure 21   Monthly percent changes in the value of the dollar versus currencies of 
major trading partners post-shock 
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Figure 22   Monthly percent change in the value of the dollar versus currencies of 
other important trading partners post-shock 
 
When compared to currencies of other important trading partners, the value of 
the dollar strengthens significantly following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Both the 
mean of the “Big 3” major events and the mean of all six events, depicted in Figure 
21, show an increase in the value of the dollar of more than 10 percent after 12 
months. The U.S. Federal Reserve calculates a separate trade-weighted dollar index 
composed of 19 “other important trading partners” (OITP) which generally include 
Mexico, China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brazil, Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Argentina, Venezuela, 
Chile and Colombia. The U.S. dollar remains, for the most part, the world’s reserve 
currency, and thus the health of the U.S. dollar impacts all economies, currencies, and 
global investments.  
The theoretical explanation of the foreign exchange adjustment is that during 
periods of crisis and uncertainty, there is flight to quality in the international currency 
market similar to the flight to quality observed in the fixed income market. Following 
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the 9/11 attacks, for instance, emerging markets were impacted by slowing external 
demands and a flight to quality in the financial markets (Johnston and Nedelescu, 
2005). Flight to quality episodes are a major driver of financial instability, and involve 
higher perceived risk that does not circumscribe purely fundamental shock, but rather 
centers around the financial system (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2005). Although 
the attack increases the level of financial uncertainty around the domestic U.S. 
economy, the impacts ripple throughout the international financial system.  
The occurrence of an unanticipated attack on U.S. agriculture causes an 
increase in agents’ risk perception. This effectively lowers portfolio demand for 
emerging market currencies and increases demand for safer and more liquid 
currencies, such as the euro and U.S. dollar, because major currencies are perceived as 
safe havens and typically trade in liquid financial markets. Investor conservatism and 
appetite for quality and liquidity increases demand for major currencies relative to 
emerging market currencies, and hence increases the value of the dollar relative to 
currencies of other important trading partners. 
 
10.2    Interpreting the Results: Impact on Real GDP Growth Rates 
This section provides estimates of the financial impacts of a terrorist attack on 
U.S. agriculture. The impacts in my model are based on add factor changes derived 
from historical financial variable averages presented in section 9.1. The total economic 
impact of the terrorism event is assumed to be the difference between real GDP 
growth in the baseline (sans terrorism) scenario and the post-terrorism scenario. 
Further, the add factor adjustments were the only revisions to the model, and thus 
represent the only differences between the two scenarios. Other exogenous variables, 
such as oil prices and policy parameters, remain fixed at baseline levels. 
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The proposed attack is assumed to occur during the beginning of the third 
quarter of 2005. The projected 2005 annual real GDP growth rate falls slightly, from 
3.56 percent in the baseline forecast to 3.48 percent in the post-shock forecast. As 
shown in Table 37, the economic impact on 2005 full-year real GDP will be muted, 
because included in this projection are two full quarters of pre-shock growth. Looking 
ahead to 2006 projections, annual real GDP growth falls from an estimated 3 percent 
in the baseline forecast to an estimated 2.66 percent in the post-shock forecast. This 
one-third of one percent decline in the projected annual real GDP growth is slight, but 
translates into significant output losses. On a fourth quarter over fourth quarter basis, 
real GDP growth falls from 3.34 percent in the baseline forecast to 3.1 percent the 
post-shock forecast in 2005. The estimated 2006 real GDP growth on a fourth quarter 
over fourth quarter basis again falls about one-third of one percent, from 2.86 percent 
in the baseline forecast to 2.52 percent in the post-shock forecast. 
 
Table 37   Projected Real GDP 2005-2010: Baseline versus post-shock (trillions $) 
Year Baseline Post-shock 
2005Q1 11.0888 11.0888 
2005Q2 11.1745 11.1745 
2005Q3 11.2796 11.2701 
2005Q4 11.3620 11.3357 
2006Q1 11.4437 11.4121 
2006Q2 11.5267 11.4906 
2006Q3 11.6011 11.5514 
2006Q4 11.6872 11.6255 
2007Q1 11.7706 11.7004 
2007Q2 11.8749 11.7992 
2007Q3 11.9701 11.8915 
2007Q4 12.0752 12.0008 
2008Q1 12.1701 12.1057 
2008Q2 12.2769 12.2244 
2008Q3 12.3690 12.3289 
2008Q4 12.4604 12.4329 
2009Q1 12.5490 12.5322 
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Table 37   (Continued) 
2009Q2 12.6425 12.6338 
2009Q3 12.7269 12.7227 
2009Q4 12.8235 12.8214 
2010Q1 12.9130 12.9092 
2010Q2 13.0121 13.0064 
2010Q3 13.0968 13.0897 
2010Q4 13.1911 13.1829 
 
The shocks were imposed on the model by adjusting appropriate add-factors 
for one year following the attack. This adjustment restricted the direct impact to the 
first four quarters following the attack; however, the total impacts extend for more 
than two years. The terrorist attack reduces U.S. economic growth rates for 9 
consecutive quarters, from the third quarter of 2005 through the third quarter of 2007. 
By 2010 the model reaches a longer-term equilibrium, and the economic growth rates 
in the two scenarios are roughly equivalent. As noted, the decline in annual real GDP 
growth rates is modest, but in dollar terms the losses are substantial. The cumulative 
current value loss in real GDP from the third quarter of 2005 through the fourth 
quarter of 2009 amounts to approximately $190 billion.  
The estimated $190 billion in lost output is never recovered despite estimates 
showing that economic growth rates beyond 2010 are roughly equivalent in both the 
baseline and post-shock forecasts. Although growth rates eventually recover from the 
shock, the economy is growing off a lower base level of output. Figure 24 illustrates 
this result. The area between the two curves represents cumulative losses in real GDP. 
Figures 25 and 26 provide the distribution of projected short-term annual losses in real 
GDP over time. Approximately 13.7 percent of the total losses accrue in 2005, 32.1 
percent accrue in 2006, 38.8 percent accrue in 2007, 14.4 percent accrue in 2008, and 
1.1 percent accrue in 2009.  
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Figure 23   Projected Real GDP: Baseline versus post-shock scenarios (trillions $) 
 
 
Table 38   Projected short-term annual losses in real GDP on a fourth quarter over 
fourth quarter basis from 2005-2009 
Year Annual losses in billions $ Percent of total 
2005 -26.22 13.67 
2006 -61.65 32.12 
2007 -74.45 38.79 
2008 -27.58 14.37 
2009 -2.02 1.05 
Total -191.92 100.00 
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Figure 24   Projected short-term annual losses in real GDP from 2005-2009 
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Figure 25   Projected annual and cumulative losses in real GDP (2005-2009) 
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10.3    Alternative Simulations 
Through measuring statistical responses against a linear regression line we 
might improve model robustness for the first-quarter monthly response values. 
However, given that the historical response path requires a full 12 months to return to 
pre-shock levels – and perhaps longer under more extreme assumptions – there is little 
evidence to suggest that linear time trend analysis improves accuracy among the 
longer-term add-factor estimates. Given that add factor adjustments are imposed for 
the entirety of one year, it makes little sense to compromise the integrity of medium-
term shock estimates for the sake of improved short-term model accuracy. Instead, we 
can change the model assumptions regarding the severity of the attack in order to 
improve model robustness and produce a distribution of output losses.  
The $190 billion estimate is based on mean changes to the financial variables, 
and can be considered a statistically conservative estimate. To that end, a catastrophic 
agroterrorism event would not necessarily yield data responses that track the historical 
mean precisely. To account for this, I have isolated the “Big 3” events in the model 
output displays to illustrate a more probable response for events that are more extreme 
than all events taken collectively. For example, the results provided in section 10.1 
support the notion that a more serious attack would deepen the impact on investor risk 
preferences and widen credit spreads more dramatically.  
Further, we can adjust the parameter add-factors to reflect a shock one-half or 
one full negative standard deviation from the mean to generate model results that 
reflect more serious impacts than historical averages. Such scenarios are not 
unrealistic, considering the high vulnerability and importance of agriculture and 
related industries to the broader national economy. In previous chapters I discussed 
these vulnerabilities as well as the high-probability, high-consequence nature of U.S. 
agroterrorism. If the proposed attack is larger than mean levels indicate, then the total 
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impacts will be magnified. Figure 27 shows the distribution of losses for alternative 
assumptions regarding the level of impact to the consumer sentiment variable, based 
on the statistics provided in Table 29.  
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Figure 26   Distribution of output losses 
 
Imposing a shock to consumer sentiment one negative standard deviation 
beyond the mean, while holding the other adjusted add-factors at average shock levels, 
decreases real GDP by an additional $200 billion over four years. Imposing a shock to 
consumer sentiment two negative standard deviations beyond the mean decreases real 
GDP by an additional $400 billion over four years. If we run post-shock simulations 
for each individual parameter, while holding the other model add-factors at baseline 
levels, we can isolate the marginal impacts over consecutive time periods and 
determine the timing of real GDP losses. The losses attributable to consumer 
sentiment are concentrated in the first 12 months following the attack. After 24 
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months the marginal impacts become negligible. The marginal impacts of higher 
interest rates, a flight to quality in the fixed income markets, and a weaker equities 
market remain negative throughout the entire forecast time period. Not surprisingly 
the losses attributed to the stock market decline do not factor in significantly two full 
years after the attack, which speaks to the efficiency of the broader market for equity 
securities.  
The impacts in the foreign exchange markets associated with the increased 
value of the dollar against currencies of other important trading partners are greatest in 
year two. Projected losses attributed to foreign exchange exceed projected losses 
attributed to any individual parameter, totaling almost $60 billion after two years. The 
estimated losses attributed to lower consumer sentiment total $30 billion after two 
years, or roughly half of the amount attributed to foreign exchange. Together, 
consumer sentiment and foreign exchange effects constitute nearly 50% of the total 
impact, with the remainder coming from the stock market, interest rates, and bond 
yields. The marginal impact of the trade sector becomes positive in the fourth and fifth 
years after the attack, reflecting movement of the U.S. dollar to more normal levels 
versus currencies of other important trading partners.  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
11.1   Summary of Findings 
Using SAM modeling techniques and the IMPLAN database, I have assessed 
the general equilibrium impacts of a terrorist attack on agriculture in St. Lawrence 
County, New York.  Assumptions were made about the severity of the FMD attack, 
and each FMD attack simulation was coupled with a 10-percent reduction in tourism 
demand. This reduction in tourism demand stems from government enforcement of 
restricted access areas, ongoing food safety concerns, and fears over potential 
recurrence of the disease. 
The regional analysis illustrates that although various industries seem unrelated 
to livestock and thus insulated from impacts on agriculture, the inter-connectedness of 
industries within the local economy leads to outcomes in which the total economic 
impacts are widespread. Although economic losses of the proportion suggested here 
could arise from a number of exotic animal diseases, the thesis focused on an FMD 
attack scenario given the severe economic losses associated with the virus and the high 
priority of preventing the outbreak.  
The macro analysis illustrates that the impacts of agroterrorism across the 
national economy would overshadow the regional impact estimates across all model 
assumptions regarding the severity of the attack. Although the economy has shown 
resilience to economic disruptions, the economic damage associated with an attack on 
U.S. agriculture has been projected to slow economic growth rates into the future. 
These adjustments in quarterly real GDP growth estimates are slight, yet translate into 
significant present value losses in output. Although growth rates are estimated to 
recover within 9 quarters of the attack, the cumulative losses in national output are 
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never fully recovered. The results suggest that an agroterrorist attack would increase 
investor uncertainty, and that this prevailing condition would in turn generate impacts 
to consumer sentiment and to financial asset classes in stocks, bonds, and currency 
markets. In the face of financial uncertainty, investors attempt to withdraw from 
medium to long-term capital commitments in favor of safe and liquid financial claims. 
 
11.2    Policy Implications 
The regional simulation results suggest that the impact on the tourism industry 
would likely dwarf the impact on the livestock industry. From an economic point of 
view, policy makers should take account of the impact on outside industries when 
formulating response procedures to agroterrorism. Because animal products from 
countries that have earned FMD-free status sell at a premium, and because countries 
that adopt a full vaccination approach restrict their access to high-value markets in the 
short-run, there exists a shortsighted focus on fully eradicating the disease through 
total stamping out, which may or may not be economically optimal from a cost-benefit 
perspective. Furthermore, the likelihood of tourism-related activities effectively 
spreading the disease between animal herds has not been adequately established, and 
remains a topic of future research. While steps should be taken to lessen the impact on 
agriculture, these steps could quickly amplify the economic damage if tourism is 
negatively impacted as a result of the response measures. 
A complete study of alternative response measures is not the focus of this 
research, yet given these results, government officials might reevaluate the assumed 
policy of mass slaughtering of exposed animals, and consider partial stamping-out 
(slaughter of only clinically infected livestock) procedures or eradication through 
vaccination. These alternatives would mitigate the losses to agriculture while 
simultaneously preserving the economic vitality of tourism and other industries. The 
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assumed direct impacts to tourism, which are conservative by design, have significant 
general equilibrium impacts that are imposed not by the terrorist, but by the 
government in response to the initial attack. In the event of an FMD attack, it is 
recommended that government officials actively pursue strategies aimed at dual goals: 
eradicating the FMD virus, and minimizing damage to nonagricultural industries.   
Given the results of the macro analysis, policy makers should widen their focus 
from a firm-level or county-level view to a macro-level view of terrorism. The macro 
results show that the costs to the national economy are significant in terms of slower 
growth and lower output levels. The macro component focuses initially on projections 
based on mean historical averages for the sake of conservatism, and as we allow for 
shocks beyond the mean, the model estimates grow significantly. The macro 
component also places a valuable benchmark in the process of estimating the 
economic impacts of agroterrorism, using a methodology that captures the probable 
impacts to broad asset classes within U.S. financial markets. 
 
11.3   Directions for Future Research 
The macroeconomic research might be extended to foreign countries that have 
experienced shocks affecting financial variables in order to increase the number of 
observations and to compare the movement of foreign financial variables against what 
I have projected for the U.S. economy. In terms of future regional analysis of 
agroterrorism, steps can be taken to formulate an operational research question aimed 
at addressing if other sectors, in addition to livestock, dairy, and tourism, would 
experience direct, initial impacts. I am careful not to claim that an FMD attack would 
be contained and prevented from spreading to neighboring regions. Indeed, given the 
various avenues through which the virus could be spread following the initial 
introduction, it is unlikely that in the long run the disease would be limited to the 
 96
region under study. Further research may build on the model presented here, in an 
attempt to simulate regional impacts beyond a single round and to estimate the inter-
regional effects of agroterrorism. Although the regional model applied in this thesis 
depicts diminished expenditures within the agricultural and tourism sectors, it does not 
take measure of the impact to surrounding regions or to the overall national economy.  
 Future research could examine the impact of agroterrorism on the 
distribution of income among households, including Gini coefficients, to see whether 
inequality changes under the different scenarios. This task could be accomplished 
using the SAM model described in Chapter Two. Future research might also model the 
impact on tourism as a function of the impact on livestock dairy output. To my 
knowledge there is no study that models an FMD attack under variable impacts to the 
tourism industry, and it seems plausible that the impact on tourism would directly 
relate to the severity of the initial attack. As the disease spreads, the size of the 
infected area grows and the reach of the quarantine enforcement expands, which 
further disrupts tourism activity.  
 The methodology follows previous studies recorded in the literature, by 
imposing a 10-percent shock to tourism that is fixed across all simulations. However, 
larger impacts on livestock might translate into larger impacts on tourism, because the 
volume of slaughtering, burning, and burying would increase, along with heightened 
fears over the safety of the food supply and the threat of re-infection. Further research 
might explore a scenario in which the medium-term impact no longer assumes that the 
smallest of livestock impacts translates into the same tourism reduction as the largest 
of livestock impacts. Future research could perhaps relax the 10-percent tourism 
impact assumption and provide a model specification that varies the direct impact on 
tourism with the severity and scope of the attack  
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